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ABSTRACT
Despite accumulating evidence, unresolved issues remain as 
to how the components of strategy, top-management 
characteristics, and environment, as independent variables, 
combine to affect a firm's success or failure in turning 
around declining performance. To address such issues, this 
dissertation developed and tested a series of hypotheses 
that investigates the effects of strategy, top-management 
characteristics, and environment on performance. Findings 
show that turnaround strategy alone is insufficient to 
explain differences in performance among firms. They also 
provide some support for the importance of TMG-strategy 
interaction and show a limited role for the environment in a 
firm's turnaround. Additionally, the findings show some 
limited support for the importance of all three factors 
taken in tandem. Methodological issues related to 
classifying turnaround strategies and measuring performance 
are also addressed.
viii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Increasing global competition, industrial decline, 
rapid technological change, government deregulation, and 
managerial complacency have contributed to performance 
crises in an increasing number of firms (Hoffman, 1989; 
Loomis, 1993). These crises have prompted numerous 
investigations into environmental influences on performance 
decline (Argenti, 1976; Bibeualt, 1982; Lorange & Nelson, 
1987; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985), as 
well as strategies for halting such decline and turning 
around a firm's performance (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; 
Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
Additionally, limited research has focused on top 
management's role in turnaround processes (e.g., Barker & 
Barr, 1994; Stanwick, 1992). Despite accumulating evidence, 
unresolved questions remain as to how the components of 
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment, 
as independent variables, combine to affect performance as a 
criterion or outcome (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
These components, as they influence a firm's 
performance, comprise the conceptual domain of this 
dissertation (cf. Summer et al., 1990). It is generally 
argued that the alignment of a firm's strategy with its 
prevailing external milieu (i.e., general and task 
environments) affects its performance (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Porter, 1980; Summer et al., 1990). In addition, a
1
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firm's resource pool influences its success (Barney, 1991; 
Diercikx & Cool. 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). From a 
strategic management perspective, one of the most important 
resources a firm can draw upon in is the talent of its top- 
management group (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Taken in 
tandem, the thesis of this dissertation is that a firm's 
turnaround is a function of the alignment among its 
environmental conditions, strategy, and top management.
This conceptual framework is outlined in Figure 1.
The notion of alignment is critical in turnaround 
research. Firms that do not maintain an alignment among 
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment 
will ultimately decline and eventually fail (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). Further, 
reestablishing alignment is necessary for firms to turn 
around (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Consequently, achieving 
insight into the turnaround process requires investigating 
the components that permit firms to regain alignment. A 
discussion of these components as they relate to a firm's 
performance —  and, by extension, turnaround —  follows.
Strategy
Research investigating the turnaround process has 
focused primarily on the impact that specific turnaround 
strategies have in reestablishing the aforementioned 
alignment (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992;








Figure 1.1— A conceptual model of alignment among strategy, 
TMG characteristics and environment
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Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976). Investigations have 
generally studied whether firms should implement 
retrenchment-oriented strategies (e.g., cutting costs or 
downsizing operations), innovation-oriented strategies 
(e.g., introducing new products), or growth-oriented 
strategies (e.g., diversifying into new domains) to overcome 
decline. Studies have found evidence both supporting (e.g., 
Barker, 1992; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Robbins & Pearce, 
1992) and challenging (e.g., Arogyaswamy, 1992; Hofer, 1980; 
Zimmerman, 1989) the efficacy of each strategy. These 
equivocal results suggest that other components along with 
strategy are important in reestablishing alignment and 
turning around a firm's performance.
TMG Characteristics 
A firm's top management is a second component affecting 
its alignment. Strategic decisions by a top-management 
group (TMG) bridge the boundary between a firm's internal 
processes and its environment (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Research based on the strategic- 
choice perspective (Child, 1972) and the Carnegie School 
decision-making framework (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958) proposes that such decisions can be affected by 
TMG characteristics (e.g., functional background, career 
experiences, and stock ownership).1 Varying TMG 
characteristics provide firms with different talents (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Michel & Hambrick,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1992; Miles & Snow, 1978; Norburn & Birley, 1988), produce 
different TMG motives (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt,
1989), and may prompt different interpretations of 
organizational and environmental stimuli (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Meyer, 1982; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984; Thomas,
Clark, & Gioia, 1993) that can affect strategic decision 
making and, thus, a firm's alignment. Additionally, because 
firms pursue myriad strategies whose implementation may 
require diverse TMG talents, the extent to which TMG talents 
match strategies should improve performance (Gupta, 1988; 
Hambrick, 1987; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Thomas, Litschert,
& Ramaswamy, 1991). The role of TMGs in turnaround has 
received only limited empirically investigation, but some 
studies suggest that TMGs may be an important component in 
realigning firms with their environments (Ford, 1985; Hofer, 
1980; O'Neill, 1986; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Stanwick,
1992) .2
Environment 
A third component affecting alignment is the 
environment with which firms interact (Andrews, 1971; Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). The organizational 
literature varies in its view of environments from totally 
determining (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Scherer, 1980) to 
predominately controlling (Lieberson & O'Conner, 1971; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; Schmalensee, 1985) to constraining 
(Child, 1972; Porter, 1980) a firm's behavior and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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performance. It is generally argued (e.g., Astley & Van de 
Ven, 1983; Child, 1972; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1988; 
Haveman, 1992; Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Hrebeniak & Joyce, 1985), 
however, that a firm has some latitude for adapting to 
environmental demands. Turnaround studies have investigated 
some environmental factors affecting performance (e.g., 
business-cycle or life-cycle stage; Bibeault, 1982; Morrow & 
Busenitz, 1993). In general, however, most studies have 
focused on decline resulting from internal causes (e.g., 
increasing firm inefficiency) rather than from environmental 
causes (e.g., shrinking industry sales). To regain 
alignment, however, a firm must achieve fit with critical 
contingencies in its environment (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). 
Thus, gaining insight into the turnaround process requires 
investigating the impact that environmental factors have on 
a firm's ability to turn around.
Performance
As noted, it is generally argued that increasing 
alignment among a firm's strategy, top-management 
characteristics, and environment results in better 
performance —  and, by extension, turnaround (Andrews, 1971; 
Summer et al., 1990). Questions remain, however, regarding 
how to measure performance in turnaround situations (Barker 
& Mone, 1994; Winn, 1993). Turnaround studies have employed 
several measures, but little consensus exists on how to 
exactly gauge "decline" and "turnaround" (Pearce & Robbins,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1993) . Thus, conceptual development of turnaround measures 
is also important for studying the turnaround process.
In this dissertation, therefore, I develop and test a 
series of hypotheses investigating the effects that 
turnaround strategy, top-management characteristics, and 
environment have on turnaround. In doing so, I also examine 
unresolved methodological issues in turnaround research 
related to classifying turnaround strategies and measuring 
performance.
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
This chapter has noted the increasing incidence of 
performance crises in firms and highlighted the importance 
reestablishing alignment in turning around declining 
performance. To examine issues related to turnaround, the 
dissertation will investigate the effect that a firm's 
strategy, top-management characteristics, and environment 
have on turnaround. The dissertation also examines 
methodological issues related classifying turnaround 
strategies and measuring performance.
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) examines previous 
turnaround research and discusses key findings related to 
turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment.
It also highlights shortcomings in previous research.
Chapter 3 (Theory Development) begins by developing a 
strategy classification to overcome two shortcomings in 
previous research, lack of standardized terminology, and use
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of aggregated strategy classification schemes. Hypotheses 
investigating the effects of turnaround strategy, TMG 
characteristics, and environment on turnaround are then 
developed.
Chapter 4 (Methods) describes sample selection, 
measures, and methods for testing hypotheses. The chapter 
also details issues related to employing organizational 
slack as a measure of performance.
Chapter 5 (Results) presents findings relating to 
individual hypotheses. These findings show that turnaround 
strategy alone is insufficient to explain differences in 
performance among firms. They also provide some support for 
the importance of TMG-strategy interaction and show a 
limited role for the environment in a firm's turnaround. 
Finally, the findings show some limited support for the 
importance of all three factors taken in tandem.
Chapter 6 (Implications and Conclusion) begins by 
reviewing the dissertation's results. Next, it discusses 
the implications of the reported results for turnaround 
research. It also highlights limitations of the 
dissertation and concludes with a discussion of future 
research avenues.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Turnaround is an attempt to halt a performance decline 
that threatens a firm's long-term viability (Barker & Mone, 
1992; Hofer, 1980) and, in turn, to renew its health 
(Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Schendel et al., 
1976). Indications that firm viability is threatened and a 
turnaround is necessary include shrinking profit margins, 
declining market share, increasing debt, and decreasing 
working capital (Bibeault, 1982; Winn, 1993).
Previous studies have investigated sundry issues 
related to the effects of turnaround strategy, TMGs, and 
environment on a firm's performance. These studies are 
summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 prompts several observations. First, despite 
20 years' research, the efficacy of various turnaround 
strategies (e.g., retrenchment) in reestablishing alignment 
remains equivocal. Second, the importance of matching TMG 
talents to a proposed turnaround strategy has yet to be 
empirically investigated. Third, the influence that a 
firm's environment may have on its turnaround has received 
limited empirical attention. Finally, empirical turnaround 
studies have employed various measures to evaluate 
turnaround. Each of these observations will be discussed, 
in turn.
9
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Often a combination of poor 
managerial decisions and 
unfavorable environmental events 
cause decline.
Significant changes in management 
and organizational processes often 
occurred during recovery.
Major changes were necessary to 
reverse decline. Over half of 
turnarounds diversified (product 
and geographic) and about two- 
fifths divested divisions.
Further, efficiency turnarounds 
did not cure strategic problems.
Turnaround and non-turnaround 
firms sometimes pursued the same 
strategy. Thus, strategy must be 
implemented efficiently and match 
firms' resources to be successful.
Steadily declining performance may 
be tolerated. Crisis may lie 





































Firms that diversified because of 
poor performance changed top 
management to bring in managers 
with experience outside the 
railroad industry. These firms 
later divested their railroad 
operations.
Firms that did not diversify did 



















Hofer, 1980 Case studies of 
10 firms, 1951- 
1978
Major declines 






Type of turnaround needed depends 
on current strategic and operating 
health as well as industry 
characteristics.
Revenue-increasing, cost-cutting, 
asset reduction, and combination 
strategies comprise operating 
turnaround strategies. Increasing 
market share or pursuing 
segmentation/niche strategy 
comprise strategic turnaround 
strategies.
Top management must almost always 
be replaced as a precondition to 
turnaround.
Management typically responded to 



















O'Neill, 1981 51 banks, 1959
1978
3 consecutive 
years of net 
income growth at 










Few management changes occurred in 
either turnaround or non- 
tumarcund firms.
Turnaround and non-turnaround 
firms often inplemented the same 
strategies. Consequently, 
differences in management's 
ability to implement the strategy 
and timing of the turnaround may 
be important.
Decline rates for turnaround cind 



















Bibeault, 1982 81 films, 1967
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decline in net 
incane
About 80% of 
sample also 
suffered one or 






Approximately 80% of declines were 
caused by internal factors.
Firms implemented the following 
turnaround strategies:
68% management process turnarounds 
16% business cycle turnarounds 
5% competitive environment 
turnarounds 
4% product breakthrough 
turnarounds
About 70% of top managers were 
replaced. Those that were not 
replaced remained because decline 
was caused by external factors, 
management detected decline early, 



















Hambrick & 260 mature,
Schecter, 1983 industrial- 
product SBUs 
from PIMS data 
base for 4-year 
period
Average pretax 
RDI less than 
10%
ROI greater than 
20% (n=53 SBUs)
Successful turnaround firms 
pursued one of three strategies:
(1) Firms cut costs (R&D, 
marketing, inventory), reduced 
receivables, and increased 
employee productivity and market 
share. (2) Firms far below break 
even implemented asset/cost 
surgery. (3) Firms implemented a 
piecemeal strategy of increasing 
employee productivity and capacity 
utilization.
Successful turnaround strategies 
differed from unsuccessful 
turnaround strategies.
Turnaround strategy depended on 
capacity utilization and market 
share.
Firms probably did not inplement 
revenue generating strategies 
because maturity stage of life 
cycle does not allow for large 

























ROI decline for 
four years and 
ROI at sente 
point falling 
below 5%
ROI greater than Most successful turnaround firms 
5% suffered only moderate decline
whereas most unsuccessful 
turnaround firms suffered severe 
decline.
Successful turnaround firms had 
higher numbers of acquisitions! 
during decline phase than 
unsuccessful turnaround firms.
Successful turnaround firms 
increased slack resources 
(retained earnings/equity) more 
than unsuccessful turnaround firms 
during recovery.
Industry growth rate was highex 
for successful turnaround firms 
than for unsuccessful turnaround 
firms during recovery.
Successful turnaround firms were 
larger than unsuccessful 





































Management competence and value 
structures oriented toward growth 
were inadequate during shakeout.
Centralized structure and 
autocratic management led to 
gradual narrowing of management 
competence as the environment 
changed.
Top management was always 
replaced. Five of nine firms 
achieving successful turnaround 
replaced CEO with insiders while 
three of four firms not achieving 
turnaround replaced CEO with 
insiders.
Successful turnaround firms 
normally had seme degree of 
restructuring.
Management should be changed if 
such a move will increase worker, 
supplier, or customer confidence. 
If replacing management will 
alienate any of these 
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RCA in top 25% Successful turnaround firms were
of industry in generally smaller than
years 7 and 8 unsuccessful turnaround firms.
Return to 
profitability
Both successful and unsuccessful 
turnaround firms had higher debt 
levels than their industry 
averages during decline.
Successful turnaround firms, 
however, had lower debt levels 
during recovery.
Successful turnaround firms 
exhibited seme change in ownership 
from externally controlled to 
owner controlled.
Industry growth rates for 
successful and unsuccessful 
turnaround firms were both 
negative.
Turnaround is a multifaceted 
process.
A new and adaptive view of the 
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between 1902 
and 1987, 0=8 
successful 



















Successful firms had more severe 
declines than unsuccessful firms.
Successful firms exhibited better 
performance in terms of efficiency 
(e.g., inventory management, and 
production), and became low cost 
producers in the industry, 
unsuccessful firms diversified or 
acquired other firms.
Successful firms inplemented 
small, incremental improvements to 
increase quality and differentiate 
products. Unsuccessful firms made 
significant and abrupt product 
changes.
Successful firms had CEOs with 
extensive industry experience, 
production or engineering 
background, and long tenures. 
Unsuccessful firms had CEOs with 
limited industry experience, sales 



































for four years 
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in the first and 
last two years 
of study was 
positive
Both successful and unsuccessful 
turnaround firms cutback in terms 
of enployees, cost of goods sold, 
inventories, receivables, and 
selling, general and 
administrative expenses.
Successful turnaround firms, 
however, were able to translate 
cutbacks into higher efficiency 
more often than unsuccessful 
turnaround firms.
Successful turnaround firms 
adopted both efficiency and 
rejuvenation (i.e., 
entrepreneurial) strategies more 
often than unsuccessful turnaround 
firms.
Adoption of efficiency strategies 
during decline and recovery were 
positively associated with 
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than 50% of 
predowntum 
levels
Change in strategic orientation is 
positively associated with 
turnaround success.
Change in CEO (either voluntary or 
not) alone was not associated with 
turnaround success.
level of slack resources is 
positively associated with 
turnaround success.
Change in CEO along with strategic 
























2 years of 
increasing ROI 
and ROS followed 
by:
(1) absolute 
declines in both 
ROI and ROS for 
a minimum of two 
years
(2) rate of 
decline in ROI 
and ROS greater 
than industry 
average over two 
year period




increases in ROI 




(2) Return to 
predowntum ROI 
and ROS levels
Firms that retrench outperform 
those that do not.
Asset and cost retrenchment were 
both significantly associated with 
increased turnaround for high 
severity firms but not low 
severity.
External cause led to 
entrepreneurial turnarounds while 
























3 years of 
decreasing value 
for Altman's Z- 
score and a Z- 
soore less that 
3.00 for each 
year
3 years of 
increasing value 
for Altman's Z- 
score and a Z- 
score of at 
least 3.00 for 
the last year of 
turnaround
CEO succession was not 
significantly higher in successful 
turnaround than unsuccessful 
turnaround firms.
Incidence of outside succession 
were not significantly higher than 
insider succession in successful 
turnaround firms.
Incidence of operational, 
strategic, and combination 
turnaround strategies did not 
differ significantly across CEOs 
with different functioned, 
backgrounds.
CEOs with law, finance, general 
administration, or accounting 
backgrounds led significantly more 
(pc.10) successful turnaround 
firms than CEOs with other 
functional backgrounds.
Successful turnaround firms 
implemented combination strategies 
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1993 primary metals 
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in return on 
average
investment from 
the year 3 to 
year 4
Mature firms that retrenched 
(i.e., cut SG&A expense, interest 
expense, and total assets) 
improved performance more tlian 
those that did not retrench.
Growth firms that retrenched also 
improved performance more tlian 
those that did not retrench, but 
the performance improvement was 
not evident until year 4.
Firms did not have to follow a 
"strict" retrenchment strategy to 
realize performance improvements 
(e.g., seme successful turnaround 
firms reduced expenses while 
slightly increasing assets).
Lower debt/total asset ratios led 
to better performance recovery.
Size (i.e., net sales in year 0) 




A firm's strategy is a set of decisions that aligns its 
strengths and weaknesses with environmental opportunities 
and threats (Andrews, 1971). Establishing and maintaining 
this alignment should result in higher performance (Summer 
et al., 1990). Consequently, turnaround research has 
primarily focused on investigating the efficacy of 
particular turnaround strategies in reestablishing alignment 
and turning around performance.
Studies have suggested three general turnaround 
strategies: retrenchment, innovation, and growth. Empirical 
attention has predominantly focused on retrenchment 
strategies (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Hambrick & Schecter, 
1983; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992) whereas theoretical arguments have 
highlighted rationales for all three strategies (Bibeault, 
1982; Hedburg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Hofer, 1980; 
Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). 
Retrenchment strategies involve cutting costs (e.g., 
selling, general, and administrative expenses) , liquidating 
assets (e.g., unprofitable products or divisions), and other 
efficiency-oriented actions to realign a firm with its 
environment and turn around its performance (Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992). Innovation strategies involve increasing 
marketing efforts and expanding markets for current or 
adapted products (Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Zammuto &
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Cameron, 1985). Growth strategies involve diversifying into 
new business segments to reduce dependence on declining 
business segments or to apply a firm's strengths to other 
segments (Barker, 1992; Schendel et al., 1976; Zammuto & 
Cameron, 1985). In addition, studies have investigated 
whether a firm can implement different strategies 
simultaneously (e.g., expanding marketing efforts to some 
segments while eliminating service in other segments; Barker 
& Duhaime, 1994) or whether some ordering of strategies is 
necessary for turn around (e.g., retrenchment followed by 
growth; Bibeault, 1982; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Retrenchment strategies
The predominant model of the turnaround process 
contends that firms facing decline must first achieve 
financial stability through retrenchment actions before 
implementing other strategies such as innovation or growth 
(Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). According to this 
model, firms will require different degrees of retrenchment 
based on decline severity.
For low severity situations (e.g., declining sales or 
shrinking margins), firms may regain alignment by becoming 
more cost efficient (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). For example, 
firms may reduce research and development (R&D) investment 
and marketing expenses, as well as drop marginally 
profitable products to increase efficiency and restore 
competitiveness (Hambrick, 1985; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).
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For high severity situations (e.g., imminent 
bankruptcy) firms may have to implement more drastic actions 
to regain alignment. In this situation, firms may lay off 
personnel or sell entire divisions (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & 
Robbins, 1992) to stem decline. The focus in such 
situations is to reduce a firm's fixed costs and asset base 
to improve efficiency and restore competitiveness (Freeman & 
Cameron, 1993; Hambrick, 1985).
As noted, the majority of empirical turnaround studies 
have studied the efficacy of retrenchment strategies 
following performance decline. These studies have generally 
found that firms pursuing a retrenchment strategy 
successfully turned around performance (Hambrick & Schecter, 
1983; Hofer, 1980; Morrow & Busenitz, 1992; Robbins &
Pearce, 1992; Zimmerman, 1989). Consequently, these studies 
have argued that firms facing decline must initially 
stabilize their financial health by retrenching prior to 
making longer term adjustments (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Conflicting results, however, also exist. For example, 
studies have found that retrenchment is inadequate for 
(Arogyaswamy, 1992) or even detrimental to (Schreuder, Van 
Cayseele, Jaspers, & De Graff, 1991) a firm's turnaround 
success. Further, retrenchment may lead a firm to cut key 
expenses (e.g., marketing) or sell its most valuable assets 
in times of financial distress. These actions may provide 
liquidity or increased efficiency in the short term, but
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could have adverse effects on a firm's long-term recovery 
(Barker & Mone, 1994).
Innovation strategy
In contrast to turning around through retrenchment, 
firms may be able to innovate as a means of reestablishing 
alignment. An innovation strategy involves focusing efforts 
and redirecting investments to areas that will increase 
market penetration or produce new products (Hofer, 1980; 
O'Neill, 1986; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). Firms implementing 
this strategy attempt to turn around by increasing sales 
through such actions as increased advertising, redoubling 
selling efforts, and lowering prices (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983) .
To date, studies have also provided conflicting 
findings regarding the efficacy of an innovation strategy 
for declining firms. For example, Hambrick and Schecter 
(1983) found that firms implementing an innovation strategy 
in situations where market shares are relatively fixed 
(i.e., mature industries) are unsuccessful in turning 
around. Some case studies (e.g., Hofer, 1980; O'Neill,
1986), however, have found that an innovation strategy helps 
some firms reestablish alignment and turn around.
Growth strategy
A second alternative to retrenchment may be for firms 
to grow out of decline. A growth strategy involves 
diversifying firms into new business lines. Firms may
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diversify to reduce dependence on shrinking markets (Miles, 
1982; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989) or to find industries 
where a firm's strengths can be employed more profitably 
(Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).
Conflicting evidence again exists regarding the 
efficacy of a growth strategy for declining firms. For 
example, Schendel et al. (1976) found that over half of 
their sample of successful turnaround firms diversified 
either in terms of product or geography, and Barker (1992) 
concluded that changes in strategic orientation were 
positively and significantly related to turnaround. In 
contrast, Zimmerman (1989) found that unsuccessful firms 
followed diversification or acquisition strategies whereas 
successful firms remained focused on attaining efficiency 
within their present industries.
Review of turnaround studies indicates that firms may 
have several viable strategies to help reestablish alignment 
and, thus, turn around. Conflicting findings, however, 
present questions regarding the efficacy of each strategy. 
This ambiguity may exist because previous studies have 
failed to recognize critical differences across turnaround 
situations (Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1994; 
Winn, 1993), have employed different strategy 
classifications, thus limiting generalizability (Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993), or have used vague or broad classifications 
that aggregate different strategies.
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First, studies have employed samples that include firms 
facing different types of decline and turnaround, which may 
have contributed to ambiguous results. In her review of the 
turnaround literature, Winn (1993) argued that different 
turnaround situations exist and failure to control for these 
types across samples may lead to contradictory results. For 
example, firms threatened with imminent bankruptcy face 
different demands than firms that are simply underperforming 
in an industry or facing moderate decline. Additionally, 
firms experiencing decline because of internal problems may 
face different turnaround situations than firms declining 
because of external factors (Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Staw, 
Sanderlands, & Dutton, 1981). Few studies, however, have 
considered these heterogeneity problems.
Second, ambiguous results may derive from previous 
studies classifying turnaround strategies in different ways. 
Inconsistent terminology across these classifications has 
slowed empirical progress in turnaround research as 
different studies often ignore previous investigations and 
adopt different terms for similar processes (Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993). For example, some studies examining the 
efficacy of turnaround strategies have classified responses 
as either operating or strategic turnarounds. Operating 
responses have been defined to include increasing revenues, 
cutting costs, and selling assets. Studies have also 
labeled these attempts to gain efficiency as operating
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turnarounds (Hofer, 1980), "stopping the bleeding"
(Bibeault, 1982), cutback strategies (Arogyasvamy, 1992; 
O'Neill, 1986), and retrenchment (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
Strategic responses have focused on changing a firm's 
competitive strategy within the same domain or moving into 
new domains (Hofer, 1980). Investigations have also labeled 
these as growth strategies (O'Neill, 1986), rejuvenation 
strategies (Arogyaswamy, 1992), and recovery strategies 
(Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
Third, ambiguous results may exist because previous 
studies have employed broad or vague strategy 
classifications that obscure turnaround processes. For 
example, Robbins and Pearce (1992) and Morrow and Busenitz
(1993) classified both "cost-cutting measures" and "selling 
divisions" as retrenchment strategies. These actions, 
however, may require different management talents and have 
different performance results. Consequently, they should be 
considered separately.
Thus, despite accumulating research, questions still 
remain regarding the efficacy of different turnaround 
strategies. To answer these questions, an improved strategy 
classification scheme needs to be developed that 
incorporates previous research and recognizes specific 
implementable strategies.
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TMG Characteristics
A firm's top-management group can also affect 
alignment. A TMG scans its firm's environment, interprets 
information, and, based on this information, makes strategic 
decisions that affect alignment (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; 
Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Because TMGs 
have different talents, motives, and interpretations of 
organizational and environmental stimuli, they can play a 
critical role in reestablishing alignment and turning around 
a firm. The importance of different TMG characteristics has 
been suggested in case studies of successful turnarounds 
(e.g., Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Zimmerman, 1989), but has 
yet to be empirically investigated (D'Aveni, 1989; O'Neill, 
Bedard, Hussein, & Gutharaji, 1990).
Turnaround research has been primarily limited to 
describing managerial characteristics purportedly needed in 
turnaround situations (e.g., a "take charge" orientation and 
good financial skills; Gerstein & Reisman, 1983), or more 
often to the sweeping conclusion that performance slippage 
signals the need for a new TMG (Hofer, 1980; Bibeualt,
1982). This last argument also receives support in the 
strategic management (Chandler, 1962; Miles & Snow, 1978) 
and organizational change literatures (Helmich & Brown,
1972; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Virany, Tushman, & 
Romanelli, 1992), which argue that as a TMG's average 
company tenure increases, it falls victim to inertia and
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loses its ability to adapt to a changing environment. 
Consequently, according to these literatures, replacing a 
long-tenured TMG, particularly with outside managers, 
represents the most effective way of changing a firm's 
strategic direction and, ultimately, reversing declining 
performance.
Research into the performance effect of replacing TMGs 
in decline situations (with its primary focus on CEOs), 
however, has yielded equivocal results (Furtado & Karan, 
1990; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Many turnaround studies have 
concluded that replacing incumbent TMGs represents a 
necessary first step in turning around a troubled firm. For 
example, Schendel et al. (1976) found that 44 of 54 firms 
that effected a turnaround made management changes, and 39 
firms changed general managers including their CEOs. These 
results are supported by other studies that have also found 
high management turnover in turnaround firms (Bibeault,
1982; O'Neill, 1986; Slatter, 1984). These studies contend 
that sweeping changes may be necessary because faulty 
decisions by an incumbent TMG can contribute to a prevailing 
crisis, and, consequently, new management is needed to 
revive a firm (Hofer, 1980).
Contrary results, however, also exist. For example, 
Zimmerman (1989) found that successful turnaround firms 
retained their current TMGs. He found that these firms were 
led by long-tenured managers with extensive experience
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within each firm's industry. Others have found that 
replacing TMG members, especially CEOs, has little effect on 
turning around declining performance (Barker, 1992;
Stanwick, 1992).
The role of TMGs in turnaround may be ambiguous because 
extant studies have focused on retaining or replacing a TMG 
instead of focusing on how well a TMG's talents match a 
firm's strategic needs (Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Kidwell, 
1992) . A growing body of research has shown, however, that 
the interaction between TMG talents and a firm's strategy 
can affect performance (Gupta, 1988; Hambrick, 1987; Thomas 
et al., 1991). Specifically, to the extent that a firm has 
a TMG with appropriate talents to implement a particular 
strategy, its performance will increase (Michel & Hambrick,
1992) .
TMG-Strateov Interaction
To study TMG-strategy interaction, studies have 
investigated both business- (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; 
Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Virany & Tushman, 1986; 
Govindarajan, 1989; Thomas et al., 1991) and corporate-level 
strategies (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). In terms of business- 
level strategies (i.e., those strategic decisions involving 
how a firm will compete within its current domain) , research 
has found that different TMG talents were associated with 
increased performance for firms implementing an efficiency 
rather than an innovation strategy. For an efficiency
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strategy, TMG backgrounds in production were associated with 
higher performance (Govindarajan, 1989). For an innovation 
strategy, TMG backgrounds in marketing and sales were 
associated with higher performance (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
1984; Thomas et al., 1991). In addition, firms having TMGs 
with talents that did not match their strategies (e.g., 
marketing backgrounds with an efficiency strategy), suffered 
decreased performance (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).
In terms of corporate-level strategies (i.e., those 
strategic decisions affecting the choice of domains in which 
a firm will compete), research has found that different TMG 
talents are associated with increased performance for firms 
implementing different types of growth strategies. For 
example, Michel and Hambrick (1992) posited that different 
diversification strategies require different levels of 
integration among a firm's business units, and, 
consequently, ideal TMG talents will vary based on a firm's 
strategy. They found that increased fit between TMG 
characteristics and a firm's strategy was associated with 
higher performance.
Despite these findings, the performance effects of TMG- 
strategy interaction have not yet been empirically 
investigated in terms of turnaround strategies. Findings 
from studies of declining firms, however, suggest that TMG 
characteristics may also have an important effect on the 
success of a firm's turnaround effort. For example, some
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bankruptcy studies have found that deficiencies in TMG 
talents may contribute to performance decline (D'Aveni,
1989; D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) . 
Previous findings also suggest that TMG characteristics, 
such as experience in different industries (Dumaine, 1990) 
and TMG stock ownership (Pant, 1986), may also affect 
turnaround.
In terms of TMG-strategy interaction, a TMG's talents 
may aid a firm's turnaround following decline depending on a 
firm's strategy. For example, Hofer (1980) contended that 
"a strategist/entrepreneur should be chosen if a high- 
growth, strategic turnaround is to be pursued, whereas a 
hard-nosed, experienced cost-cutter would be more 
appropriate if an operating turnaround with a major cost 
reduction effort is to be pursued" (p. 26). On the other 
hand, lack of TMG-strategy alignment may prevent firms from 
pulling out of decline (e.g., Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; 
Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Empirical findings showing that 
firms following similar turnaround strategies enjoy 
different degrees of success (e.g., Schendel & Patton, 1976) 
further suggest the meaningful effect that a TMG may have on 
a firm's turnaround efforts (Ford, 1985).
Thus, previous research suggests that TMG-strategy 
interaction is important for improving a firm's performance. 
Additionally, although limited empirical research has 
focused on a TMG's role in turnaround, findings suggest that
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TMG-strategy interaction may help a firm regain alignment 
and turn around performance.
Environment
The impact of environmental factors on firms is well 
established in the organizational literature (Andrews, 1971; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980), yet few turnaround studies 
have specifically included such factors in empirical 
investigations. Studies have noted that environmental 
factors may contribute to a firm's decline (e.g., Bibeault, 
1982; Schendel et al., 1976), but only a few have 
empirically investigated the effect environmental factors 
may have on performance (Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Pant,
1986; Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Even 
studies investigating environmental factors have examined a 
fairly limited number of general environmental 
characteristics, such as industry growth rate (Pant, 1986; 
Ramanujam, 1984) or industry life-cycle stage (Morrow & 
Busenitz, 1993).
In terms of general environmental factors that might 
impact performance, Schendel et al (1976) noted declining 
industry demand as a source of declining performance, and 
Bibeault (1982) found that 16 percent of the 81 CEOs he 
surveyed said their firms turned around because of recovery 
in the business cycle. Other researchers have also noted 
the positive relationship between industry growth and
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successful turnaround (Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Pant, 1984; 
Ramanujam, 1984; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Thus, although some turnaround studies have 
investigated the role of environmental factors on 
turnaround, research remains limited. Given the important 
role that environmental factors can have on performance, 
this limited research into such factors represents a serious 
deficiency in turnaround research. Environmental factors, 
thus, need to be specifically considered to investigate how 
firms reestablish alignment and, subsequently, turn around.
Performance
A final issue involves the definition of performance 
(the focal dependent variable). Empirical turnaround 
studies have focused primarily on profitability measures to 
gauge decline and turnaround, but studies have varied in 
their temporal definitions of decline and recovery phases 
and in their selection of profitability measures to gauge 
performance decline and turnaround. Additionally, few 
studies have justified the use of their performance measures 
or set performance benchmarks for determining decline and 
turnaround (Winn, 1993). Consequently, conceptual 
development of performance in the context of turnaround has 
been limited (Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
In terms of defining performance, previous studies have 
often labeled firms with declining profitability or net 
income as turnaround candidates. Firms that regained
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profitability or increased net income, therefore, have been 
deemed successful turnaround firms. Even in terms of 
financial measures, however, disagreement exists regarding 
an appropriate tturnaround definition (Barker & Mone, 1994; 
Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Winn, 1993).
Some studies have used change in financial performance 
relative to historical levels to define decline and 
turnaround. For example, Schendel et al. (1976) used four 
years of uninterrupted decline followed by four years of 
increasing net income to select firms that had experienced 
decline and had turned around. Other studies (Melin, 1985; 
Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; Zimmerman, 1986) have defined 
decline as decreasing profitability from historical levels 
and turnaround as regaining some historical level of 
profitability.
Problems can arise in terms of defining decline 
relative to historical levels, however, because without an 
absolute measure, firms experiencing changes in performance 
relative to historical levels may be incorrectly classified 
as declining or turning around (Barker & Mone, 1994;
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). For example, a firm earning a 
30 percent ROI that declines to 25 percent over a few years 
could be defined as declining even though the firm may still 
be performing well. Conversely, a firm earning -30 percent 
ROI that recovers to -25 percent ROI could be labeled as
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having turned around using only relative performance 
measures.
Other studies have defined decline and turnaround 
relative to industry performance. For example, O'Neill
(1981) defined banks that had net-income growth lower than 
the industry average and then higher than the industry 
average for three consecutive years as having declined and 
turned around, respectively. Additionally, Pant (1986) 
defined firms having ROA in the bottom 25 percent of an 
industry as requiring turnaround and those that had reached 
the upper 25 percent of an industry in years 7 and 8 as 
successful turnarounds. Other research (e.g., Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993) has argued for the importance of defining 
decline and turnaround relative to a specific industry.
A problem may also arise from using performance 
relative to a specific industry because a firm may be 
underperforming its industry, but if it competes in a high 
growth industry, it could still be performing well (Pant, 
1986) . In addition, because turnaround research focuses on 
firms that have experienced decline severe enough to 
potentially threaten their survival, firms that are simply 
underperforming their industries may be inappropriate for a 
turnaround sample (Grinyer, Mayes, & McKiernan, 1988; Winn,
1993) .
Another group of turnaround studies has used 
performance minimums to define decline and turnaround. For
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example, Hambrick and Schecter (1983) defined firms that 
experienced ROI less than 10 percent as being in decline and 
those that recovered to more them 20 percent as successful 
turnaround firms. Ramanujam (1984) defined firms similarly 
setting ROI at 5 percent. Although determining an absolute 
anchor could be problematic given different average 
profitability across industries (cf. Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 
1990), setting one overcomes many of the problems from 
measuring performance relative to historical levels or 
average industry levels (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).
Further, performance minimums derived from the economics and 
finance literatures exist that translate across industries. 
Drawing from the economics literature, Barker and Mone
(1994) argued that firms that do not achieve break-even 
profitability are not covering long-run production costs and 
can be considered declining. Drawing from the finance 
literature, Barker (1992) defined firms that had 
profitability below the risk-free rate of return as 
declining because firms that cannot obtain at least the 
risk-free rate will lose investors who can gain better 
returns simply by investing in risk-free financial 
instruments (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills).
Besides employing different financial measures, few 
studies have conceptually justified their performance 
measures (Winn, 1993) , and many have defined performance 
narrowly in terms of profitability ratios (cf. Steers, 1975;
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Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Profitability measures 
(e.g., ROI) serve as key measures of performance, but they 
need to be complemented by other measures to comprehensively 
gauge performance (Chakravarthy, 1986; Woo & Willard, 1983). 
For example, Chakravarthy (1986) employed a firm's 
debt/equity ratio as a performance measure because it 
reflects a firm's ability to secure additional funds and 
adapt.
Furthermore, relying solely on profitability measures 
to gauge performance presents problems both for strategic 
research in general and turnaround studies in particular. 
First, strategic management research focuses on fitting 
firms to their environments and maintaining this fit over 
time (Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). 
Profitability measures adopt an historical perspective 
whereas strategic management research focuses on future 
adaptability. In addition, these measures emphasize 
stockholder interests over that of other stakeholders 
(Chakravarthy, 1986) .
In regards to turnaround research, because TMGs in 
declining firms may attempt to mask problems by resorting to 
"creative accounting" (Argenti, 1976; Krueger & Willard,
1990), turnaround results based on profitability may be 
suspect for two reasons. First, if TMGs can maintain 
profitability through actions such as manipulating inventory 
valuation or depreciation rates, then firms that should be
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identified as declining may not be if studies rely solely on 
profitability. Second, even if studies do identify a 
declining firm, the ability of a firm's TMG to manipulate 
profitability may result in researchers incorrectly 
identifying a firm as a turnaround when in fact its TMG has 
simply manipulated accounting practices. Hence, findings in 
either instance would be misleading.3
Summary
This literature review has discussed the importance of 
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment in 
reestablishing a firm's alignment and turning around 
declining performance. In doing so, it has highlighted 
equivocal performance results related to different 
turnaround strategies and problems in previous turnaround 
strategy operationalizations that may contribute to this 
ambiguity. Additionally, it has noted the limited empirical 
attention given to TMG and environmental factors as well as 
the limited conceptual development of performance in the 
context of turnaround. These shortcomings are addressed in 
the next chapter.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3: THEORY DEVELOPMENT
This dissertation contends that the equivocal results 
of previous turnaround studies are a consequence of the 
incomplete consideration of important components affecting a 
declining firm's alignment. In doing so, it maintains that 
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment, as well as 
the interaction among these components, may have important 
effects on reestablishing a firm's alignment and turning 
around performance. Thus, to develop a complete view of the 
turnaround process, each of these components must be 
considered.
To examine these components, the dissertation first 
adapts a general strategy classification developed by Miles
(1982), Ford (1985), and Zammuto and Cameron (1985) for use 
in classifying turnaround strategies. This adapted 
classification overcomes problems detailed earlier related 
to classification schemes used in prior turnaround studies. 
The dissertation then develops hypotheses pertaining to the 
performance effects of turnaround strategy, TMG-strategy 
interaction, and environmental characteristics.
Hypotheses
Strategy
A firm's strategy is defined as the combination of its 
present and planned resource deployments, as well as its 
environmental interactions (Ansoff, 1965; Hofer & Schendel, 
1978). Strategies, thus, can be defined both in terms of
44
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resource allocations to critical functions (e.g., R&D 
investments) and the scope of a firm's interactions with its 
environment (e.g., number of both products offered and 
industries served). This definition can be used to develop 
a scheme for turnaround strategies that overcomes problems 
with previous classifications.
The dissertation adapts a general strategy 
classification scheme proposed in previous studies of 
organizational decline (Miles, 1982; Ford, 1985; Zammuto & 
Cameron, 1985). According to this classification, firms can 
implement internal or external response strategies to 
increase alignment. An internal response strategy includes 
cost-cutting and asset reduction programs to gain efficiency 
(Ford, 1985). This strategy focuses on changing resource 
deployments by cutting expenses/investments (e.g., marketing 
or R&D) or selling inefficient assets (e.g., obsolete 
production plants). This strategy is called an "efficiency" 
turnaround strategy in the present framework, and partially 
subsumes retrenchment strategies investigated in previous 
research (e.g., Arogyaswamy, 1992; Kofer, 1980; O'Neill, 
1986; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
By contrast, external response strategies include 
increasing efforts within a firm's present domains or 
supplementing efforts in current domains with new domains 
(Ford, 1985; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). These responses can 
focus primarily on changing a firm's resource deployments or
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the scope of a firm's interactions with its environment. 
Accordingly, firms can increase efforts within their present 
domains. Such efforts focus on changing resource 
deployments by increasing expenses in areas such as 
marketing in an attempt to increase sales (Zammuto &
Cameron, 1985). This is called a "domain-offense" strategy 
in the present framework, and it subsumes innovation 
strategies investigated in previous research (e.g., Hambrick 
& Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986).
Firms can also alter the scope of their interactions 
with their environments. Firms can increase their scopes by 
diversifying into new market niches to reduce dependence on 
a shrinking industry (Miles, 1982) or to transfer skills to 
new industries (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). This strategy is 
called a "domain-creation" strategy in the present 
framework, and it subsumes growth strategies investigated in 
previous research (e.g., Schendel et al., 1976; Zimmerman, 
1989).
Alternatively, firms can shrink their scopes by 
divesting unprofitable products or divisions and refocusing 
on fewer core activities (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985). This 
strategy is called a "domain-consolidation" strategy in the 
present framework, and it subsumes the remaining 
retrenchment strategies (i.e., those not subsumed by an 
efficiency strategy) investigated in previous research 
(Hofer, 1980; Melin, 1985; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; O'Neill,
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1986). Table 3.1 reviews general strategy classifications 
and measures from previous turnaround studies in terms of 
this adapted classification scheme.4
Although turnaround studies have classified strategies 
as nominal variables (e.g., Robbins & Pearce, 1992; see also 
Venkatraman & Grant, 1986), the turnaround strategies 
discussed in the dissertation are generally consistent with 
a continuum of strategies (cf. Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984). 
At one end of the continuum, a domain-consolidation strategy 
involves divestment of business lines, whereas at the other 
end, a domain-creation strategy involves adding new business 
lines. Thus, the continuum reflects possible strategy 
options from "divest" to "build" (Gupta & Govindarajan,
1984). The midpoint on the continuum is labeled a "status- 
quo" strategy. This strategy of not making any major 
adjustments has been implemented successfully by some firms 
as they simply "wait out the storm" (such as a business 
cycle downturn; see Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Bibeault, 1982; 
O'Neill, 1986). Figure 3.1 illustrates this turnaround 
strategy continuum and positions previous studies in terms 
of this classification scheme.
This turnaround strategy framework should overcome 
three problems in previous classifications. First, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, it permits the dissertation to 
investigate the entire spectrum of possible turnaround
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Table 3.1— Review of previous studies 
in terms of the adapted classification scheme
Study Concept Label
Efficiency Strategy
Schendel, Patton, Operating 
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Figure 3.1— A continuum of turnaround strategies
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domain creation). Second, the framework is based on 
previous investigations of how firms overcome environmental 
misalignment (Miles, 1982; Ford, 1985; Zammuto & Cameron, 
1985). Third, the framework positions firms according to 
specific instead of consolidated strategy classifications. 
For example, employing this classification, a firm 
implementing a retrenchment strategy can be classified as 
implementing an efficiency strategy, which focuses primarily 
on changing a firm's resource allocations, or a domain- 
consolidation strategy, which focuses primarily on the 
changing the scope of a firm's interaction with its 
environment.
Based on findings from previous turnaround studies, 
these strategies would be expected to improve a firm's 
performance. Given the argument that firms must first 
implement retrenchment strategies prior to implementing 
innovation- or growth-oriented strategies (Morrow &
Busenitz, 1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Robbins & Pearce,
1992), the following general hypothesis is proposed:
HI: Firms implementing retrenchment strategies
(i.e., an efficiency strategy or a domain- 
consolidation strategy) following a 
performance decline will outperform firms 
implementing a domain-offense or a domain- 
creation strategy.
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TMG Characteristics
TMG decision making can have a significant impact on a 
firm's alignment, and, thus, its performance (Andrews, 1971; 
Child, 1972). Because managers remain limited by bounded 
rationality and multiple, conflicting goals when making 
complex strategic decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958), they will (by necessity) make decisions based 
on their world views. These views, in turn, can be affected 
by functional background and other career experiences, such 
as employment in multiple companies or industries (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). Additionally, because managers do not 
generally make strategic decisions in isolation, but as 
members of a TMG, TMG characteristics may provide insights 
into decision-making processes.
Different TMG characteristics can interact with 
situational variables to affect a firm's performance. These 
variables include strategies implemented by firms (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). A growing body of research suggests that 
aligning TMG skills with particular strategies may improve a 
firm's performance (Gupta, 1988; Hambrick, 1987). This 
research has focused on business- and corporate-level 
strategies, but has yet to investigate turnaround 
strategies.
A review of previous research suggests that three TMG 
demographic characteristics (viz., functional background, 
company experience, and industry experience) are related to
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a TMG's ability to implement a turnaround strategy. These 
characteristics can affect how TMGs make decisions, 
particularly in terms of how they identify problems and 
formulate their world views (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miles & Snow, 
1978; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Additionally, case studies 
of turnaround (e.g., Duhaime, 1990; Hofer, 1980) have 
suggested that all three characteristics affect a TMG's 
ability to implement turnaround strategies.5
To further investigate the effects of these 
characteristics, the dissertation employs a TMG career- 
orientation typology developed by White, Smith, and Barnett 
(1994). This typology accounts for important differences 
among TMGs in terms of functional background, company 
experience, and industry experience.6 The following career 
specializations are defined in this typology:
Core: Top managers who have a functional
specialization in production or sales with a single 
company or production within a single industry. 
Administrative: Top managers who have a functional
specialization in general management, finance, or law 
within a single company or industry, as well as those 
who have a functional specialization in production or 
sales in more than one industry.
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Environmental: Top managers who have a functional
specialization in general management, finance, or law 
in more than one industry.
TMG members can develop diverse talents from their 
different functional, company, and industry backgrounds that 
may be critical to effectively implementing varying 
strategies (Hitt, Ireland, & Palia, 1982; Miles & Snow,
1978; Snow & Hrebeniak, 1980). For example, Govindarajan 
(1989) found that TMGs with dominant backgrounds in core 
functions (e.g., production) effectively implemented 
efficiency strategies. In addition, TMGs with dominant 
backgrounds in administrative functions (e.g., sales) have 
been found to effectively implement domain-offense 
strategies (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Thomas et al.,
1991). Moreover, TMGs with dominant backgrounds in 
environmental functions (e.g., finance) have been found to 
effectively implement different domain-creation strategies 
(Graham & Richards, 1978; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Song,
1982). Further, firms having TMGs with dominant backgrounds 
that do not match their strategies have been found to suffer 
decreased performance (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984).
Extending these findings to turnaround strategies, the 
following hypotheses are suggested:
H2a: Firms implementing a retrenchment (i.e., an
efficiency or domain-consolidation) strategy whose 
TMGs have a core-function specialization will
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outperform those firms whose TMGs have 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specializations.
H2b: Firms implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMGs have an administrative-function 
specialization will outperform those firms whose 
TMGs have core- or environmental-function 
specializations.
H2c: Firms implementing a domain-creation strategy 
whose TMGs have an environmental-function 
specialization will outperform those firms whose 
TMGs have core- or administrative-function 
specializations.
Other TMG characteristics may also affect 
organizational outcomes. One such characteristic, stock 
ownership, has been hypothesized to impact TMG motives for 
implementing particular strategies such as diversification. 
Conflicting goals between a TMG and owners (e.g., 
stockholders) in firms may lead a TMG to make decisions that 
run counter to maximizing a firm's performance and, thus, 
shareholder wealth. Conversely, increasing TMG stock 
ownership may serve to align TMG and owners' goals and 
prompt a TMG to implement a strategy that increases a firm's 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
This suggests the following hypothesis:
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H2d: There will be a positive relation between TMG 
stock ownership and performance in declining 
firms.
In particular, TMGs may diversify to diffuse their 
employment risk (e.g., job or reputation loss) rather than 
to create owner/shareholder value (Amihud & Lev, 1981). In 
decline situations, the motivation for managers to reduce 
employment risk may become even more pronounced. Thus, a 
TMG with low average stock ownership may select a 
diversification (i.e., domain-creation) strategy in an 
attempt to maintain job security when other strategies may 
offer better routes to turnaround. In contrast, a TMG with 
high average stock ownership may select a domain-creation 
strategy because TMG members believe doing so will create 
shareholder value. Therefore, whereas stock ownership is 
hypothesized to be positively related to a firm's 
performance across all turnaround strategies (H2d), this 
positive relation may be stronger in firms implementing a 
domain-creation strategy because it offers TMGs the highest 
degree of employment risk diffusion. This difference in TMG 
motives may help explain conflicting findings in turnaround 
research showing that a diversification strategy can improve 
(Barker & Duhaime, 1994; Schendel et al., 1976) or decrease 
(Zimmerman, 1989) a firm's performance. This suggests the 
following hypothesis:
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H2e: There will be a stronger positive relation 
between stock ownership and performance for 
declining firms implementing a domain- 
creation strategy than for firms implementing 
either a domain-offense or retrenchment 
strategy.
Environment
Environments can be studied along several dimensions 
(Aldrich, 1979), each of which may have a different impact 
on a firm's performance (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Porter, 1980). 
Consequently, to examine the impact a firm's environment can 
have on turnaround, a multidimensional operationalization of 
environment should be employed. Dess and Beard (1984) 
presented a parsimonious environmental classification scheme 
that defines environments along three dimensions; 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity. Munificence is the 
extent of resource availability in an environment and its 
capacity to support growth (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats &
Hitt, 1988; for a review, see also Castrogiovanni, 1991). 
Dynamism is the degree to which an environment exhibits 
instability. Complexity is the heterogeneity of elements 
(e.g., competitors, suppliers, buyers) within a firm's 
environment (Child, 1972). Each of these dimensions are 
expected to affect a firm's turnaround.
Environmental munificence should be positively related 
to turnaround. A growing industry provides increased
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opportunities for firms to find new customers and can reduce 
the level of competitive intensity within an industry 
(Hofer, 1975; Porter, 1980). Consequently, firms 
experiencing performance decline in growing industries 
should turn around more often than declining firms in 
stagnant industries or industries experiencing shrinking 
resource pools (Ramanujam, 1984). Alternatively, declines 
in environmental munificence may prevent firms from turning 
around and can ultimately cause declining firms to fail 
(D'Aveni, 1989; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). The following 
hypothesis is, therefore, suggested:
H3a: Environmental munificence will be positively 
related to performance in declining firms.
Environmental dynamism should be negatively related to 
turnaround. As instability increases, a firm's decision­
making routines, established to promote efficient adaptation 
to environmental shocks, may retard adjustment to new 
environmental demands (Cyert & March, 1963) . Thus, a firm 
maintaining current routines faces increased difficulty 
learning quickly enough about its environment to 
successfully adapt (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) . Alternatively, 
a firm may attempt to develop new routines. In doing so, 
however, it must sacrifice efficiency (Nelson & Winter,
1982) and expend slack resources at a time when such 
resources may be depleted from decline (Pearce & Robbins,
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1993; Ramanujam, 1984). The following hypothesis is, 
therefore, suggested;
H3b: Environmental dynamism will be negatively related 
to performance in declining firms.
Environmental complexity should also be negatively 
related to turnaround. Increasing complexity increases a 
TMG's information processing requirements (Dess & Beard,
1984). When faced with a crisis such as performance 
decline, however, a TMG may experience threat-rigidity in 
its decision making (Staw et al., 1981). Consequently, the 
maladaptive effects of threat rigidity may be compounded in 
environments characterized by increasing complexity.
Such complexity may occur as a result of numerous 
factors. One factor defining an industry's complexity is 
the number of firms competing within the industry (Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). As the number of firms increases, the 
potential for intense competition also increases (Porter, 
1980). As a result, declining firms may face a more hostile 
competitive environment in which to attempt a turnaround as 
environmental complexity increases. In contrast, as the 
number of firms decreases, interdependence among firms 
increases allowing for more managed, benign competition 
(Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976). The following hypothesis is, 
therefore, suggested:
H3c: Environmental complexity will be negatively 
related to performance in declining firms.
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Integration
The above hypotheses will investigate the effects of 
strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and environment on 
turnaround. To provide a comprehensive view of the 
turnaround process, this dissertation also studies the 
effects of these variables as a group.
Hypothesis 3a posits that environmental munificence has 
a positive relation with turnaround. Not all firms 
operating in increasingly munificent environments, however, 
turn around (D'Aveni, 1989; Moulton & Thomas, 1988). This 
inability to reverse declining performance may result from 
TMGs with inadequate talents making suboptimal decisions 
that hinder firms from recovering (Hambrick & D'Aveni,
1992). Thus, to the extent that TMG talents deviate from 
the profiles posited in Hypotheses 2a through 2c, TMGs may 
face increasing difficulties in properly implementing 
turnaround strategies (cf. Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Thomas 
et al, 1991). These difficulties, in turn, may compound 
performance problems for firms operating in decreasingly 
munificent environments. In contrast, a match between TMG 
talents and turnaround strategy should increase the positive 
relation between environmental munificence and turnaround. 
The following hypotheses are, therefore, suggested:
H4a: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose
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TMGs have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMGs have either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H4b: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMGs have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H4c: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMGs have an environmental-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
Hypothesis 3b and 3c posit that environmental dynamism 
and complexity will both have a negative relation with 
turnaround. To the extent that TMG talents deviate from the 
profiles posited in Hypotheses 2a-2c, these negative 
relations should increase as TMGs encounter increased 
difficulty in properly implementing turnaround strategies. 
These difficulties, in turn, may compound performance 
problems for firms operating in increasingly dynamic or
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complex environments. In contrast, a match between TMG 
talents and turnaround strategy should decrease these 
negative relations. The following hypotheses are, therefore, 
suggested:
H5a: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMGs have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMGs have either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H5b: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMGs have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H5c: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMGs have an environmental-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
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H6a: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMGs have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMGs have either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H6b: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMGs have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H6c: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMGs have an environmental-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
Summary
This chapter derived hypotheses investigating the 
effect that turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and 
environment have on reestablishing a firm's alignment and 
turning around its performance. To examine the effect of
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turnaround strategy, a general strategy classification was 
adapted for classifying turnaround strategies. How this 
adapted classification scheme overcomes problems related to 
classification schemes in prior turnaround studies is 
detailed. Hypotheses pertaining to the performance effects 
of TMG-strategy interaction and environmental 
characteristics, as well as the combined performance effects 
of strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental 
characteristics were then developed. The next chapter 
presents the methods for testing these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
This chapter describes methodological issues related to 
testing hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. First, the 
chapter discusses the sample and data sources employed. 
Second, it describes issues related to employing slack as 
measure of performance. Third, it presents measures of 
strategy, TMG characteristics, environmental dimensions, and 
performance. Finally, it details methods employed for 
testing each hypothesis.
Sample
The turnaround sample used for the dissertation was 
drawn from Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT Industrial Tapes, a 
data base that reports financial information for over 6,000 
large, public U.S. corporations. The data base was searched 
for manufacturing firms experiencing performance declines 
that pose potential threats to their long-term viability 
(defined below) to meet the definition of decline previously 
presented.
The COMPUSTAT data base was employed because it 
provides detailed financial information necessary to select 
a turnaround sample large enough for statistical analysis, 
and provides data necessary to operationalize strategy, 
environment and performance measures. Additionally, several 
previous turnaround studies have employed COMPUSTAT (e.g., 
Barker, 1992? Barker & Mone, 1994; Morrow & Busenitz, 1993; 
Pant, 1986? Ramanujam, 1984) thus permitting comparative
67
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analyses. To reduce concerns about error rates in COMPUSTAT 
(Rosenberg & Houglet, 1974), data were collected for a 
random sample of firms from both COMPUSTAT and Moody's 
Industrial Reports. Information from these two sources was 
compared to assess data integrity. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between data was .999 (e <.0001). Thus, concerns 
about error rates in the data base appear alleviated.
The target sample drawn from COMPUSTAT covered a time 
period sufficient to assess turnaround. Previous turnaround 
studies have often employed periods of two to four years to 
ensure that a performance decline is not just a short-term 
downturn. Upturn cycles have been operationalized as two- 
to four-year periods to verify that a firm has indeed turned 
around (Krueger & Willard, 1991; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Schendel et al., 1976). Allowing at least two years for 
firms to implement turnaround strategies (Bibeault, 1982) 
means that target firms had to be examined for a minimum of 
six years. Given that firms may decline for more than two 
years and may need more than two years to recover (Winn,
1993), turnaround situations were examined for up to ten 
years. This timeframe is consistent with recent empirical 
turnaround research (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992). Moreover, in contrast to studies that have 
fixed time periods for decline, recovery, and turnaround 
(e.g., Pant, 1986), tracking firms for up to ten years 
permitted the investigation of firms that may have required
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different lengths of time to recover (Robbins & Pearce,
1SS2).
To select a turnaround sample, COMPUSTAT was searched 
for firms that have suffered decline. To overcome 
measurement and theoretical shortcomings in turnaround 
research (see Chapter 2) resulting from exclusive reliance 
on profitability measures, the dissertation examined decline 
and turnaround in terms of organizational slack (Bourgeois, 
1981; Chakravarthy, 1986; Cyert & March, 1963). 
Organizational slack represents a cushion of actual or 
potential resources that allows firms to adapt to internal 
or external pressures for change (Bourgeois, 1981: 30). 
Organizational slack thus provides a theoretically based 
method for measuring decline and, when used to complement 
profitability ratios, should make the study of turnaround 
less susceptible to spurious findings.
Organizational slack may also represent a useful 
turnaround measure because it overcomes many of the problems 
noted above as being associated with relying solely on 
profitability measures by providing a measure of future 
adaptability. Further, because decline is a "condition in 
which a substantial, absolute decrease in an organization's 
resource base occurs over a specified period of time" 
(Cameron, Kim, & Whetton, 1987: 224), slack represents a 
measure for determining decline and turnaround that
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corresponds with theoretical arguments in the decline 
literature.
Cyert and March (1963) first defined slack as the 
difference between resources available to a firm and 
payments required to keep stakeholder support. Cohen,
March, and Olsen (1972) later modified this definition to 
represent the difference between a firm's resources and the 
combination of demands made on the firm. Organizational 
slack thus represents a cushion of actual or potential 
resources that allows firms to adapt to internal or external 
pressures for change and, thereby, initiate changes in 
strategy (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).
Slack resources exist as a margin of error within firms 
and, therefore, remain essential to smooth functioning 
(Scott, 1987).7 Slack also allows for adaptation to 
unanticipated future events by providing a cushion to absorb 
environmental variability. Additionally, it provides a 
buffer to safeguard resources needed for product innovation 
(Thompson, 1967) . Thus, slack plays both stabilizing and 
adaptive roles (Cyert & March, 1963: 38). Slack likewise 
allows firms to weather downturns (Ford, 1985).
Consequently, slack should provide a useful means for 
assessing a firm's ability to survive in a changing 
environment. As slack diminishes, a firm's ability to adapt 
declines, and failure to adapt can lead to death (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984).
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Despite its theoretical importance, only a few studies 
have used slack as a performance measure. One such study, 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988), found that firms that 
ultimately declared bankruptcy had significantly higher debt 
levels (i.e., lower potential slack) and lower profitability 
compared to a matched sample of healthy firms. Declining 
slack, therefore, may provide advanced warning of difficult 
times. Additionally, Barker (1992) and Barker and Duhaime 
(1994) are the only turnaround studies that employ a measure 
of slack, but both included slack as an independent rather 
than as a dependent variable.
Pragmatically, slack may represent a useful complement 
to profitability for measuring decline and turnaround for 
two reasons. First, TMGs often react to diminishing slack. 
Bibeault (1982) found that key warning signals used by TMGs 
included measures of slack such as increasing debt. Second, 
slack can be operationalized using publicly available 
financial data (Bourgeois, 1981), so researchers have ready 
access to data and can replicate findings.
To select a sample of declining firms from COMPUSTAT, 
the following criteria were employed:
1. At least three years of profitability below the 
risk-free rate of return
2. At least three years of decreasing slack defined 
as decreasing available slack with a non-positive 
change in potential slack or
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decreasing potential slack with a non-positive 
change in available slack
These criteria reflect the definition of decline 
previously presented. Profitability below the risk-free 
rate represents a situation where firms are earning an 
inadequate return to attract investment (Barker, 1992). In 
the present dissertation, profitability is measured using 
return on invested capital. Risk free rate is measured 
using the annual rate of return for 6-month U.S. Treasury 
bills.
These criteria reflect the availability of different 
types of slack (Bromiley, 1991). The first type, available 
slack, reflects a firm's uncommitted liquid resources 
(Singh, 1986). Available slack was measured as the ratio of 
current assets (excluding inventory) to current liabilities 
(i.e., the quick ratio; Kieso & Weygandt, 1986). The second 
type/ potential slack, reflects resources available from a 
firm's external environment (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). 
Potential slack was measured using individual firm's 
debt/equity ratio.8
Employing both profitability and slack measures offers 
two advantages relative to past operationalizations of 
decline. First, along with profitability, both measures of 
slack provide insights into potential financial problems 
because increases in debt and decreases in liquidity portend 
increasing bankruptcy risks. Thus, firms meeting these
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criteria face potential threats to their long-term 
viability, second, although these slack measures are 
accounting-based, they make decline operationalizations less 
susceptible to the financial manipulation problems noted 
earlier. Specifically, values of current assets (i.e., 
cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable) and 
debt are more objective and, thus, less subject to 
manipulation than profitability measures.
The beginning of a firm's turnaround was measured as 
the year following its steepest drop in performance (i.e., 
its largest drop in profitability or slack). The relevant 
literature argues that pronounced drops in performance are 
often necessary to prompt turnaround (Schendel et al.,
1976). Thus, this measure coincides with recent 
operationalizations of turnaround inception (Barker & Mone, 
1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). This first year served as a 
base period for measuring change in the variables used to 
operationalize strategy.
Firms that recovered to a return on invested capital 
(ROIC) above the risk-free rate for three years and 
increased slack for three years within the timeframe of the 
study were classified as turnaround firms. Those that did 
not regain predownturn levels of performance were classified 
as "continuously declining" firms (D'Aveni, 1989). An 
initial survey of COMPUSTAT found that since 1974, 218 firms 
met the definition of decline. Firms that filed for
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bankruptcy or were acquired by other firms during their 
turnaround attempts were removed from the sample because 
strategic decisions in these firms could either made by 
bankruptcy courts or corporate parents. Additionally, firms 
less than 10-years old were also removed to avoid any 
potential confounds related to firms experiencing a 
"liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965). For example, 
new firms may have low profitability and decreasing slack as 
they attempt to establish themselves in an industry 
(Dollinger, 1995). Finally, the sample was limited to U.S. 
manufacturers. Complete data, including information on TMG 




To reflect a firm's resource allocations and scope 
(Hofer & Schendel, 1978), turnaround strategy was 
operationalized along three dimensions: costs. assets, and 
strategic change. Costs and assets measure resource 
allocation decisions, and both dimensions were necessary to 
measure a firm's turnaround strategy because each strategy 
(except the theoretical midpoint, "status quo") could 
include changes in both these dimensions. For example, 
implementing an efficiency strategy often involves reducing 
costs (e.g., marketing) and assets (e.g., number of 
employees).
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Strategic change reflects changes in a firm's scope. 
This dimension was necessary to measure a firm's turnaround 
strategy because a strategy could include no change (e.g., 
domain offense) or a substantial change (e.g., domain 
creation) in this dimension.
Costs. Resource allocation decisions related to costs 
were operationalized as a firm's sales, general, and 
administrative expense.9
Assets. Resource allocation decisions related to 
assets were operationalized as a firm's inventory, number of 
employees, and plant and equipment. All resource allocation 
measures were taken from COMPUSTAT.
Strategic chance. Firms can also change their scopes 
while attempting a turnaround. Strategic change measures 
examined these actions in terms of divestments and 
acquisitions. Strategic change was operationalized 
employing two measures, domain initiative and domain 
reduction. Domain initiative was measured as the number of 
new 4-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 
added by a firm in each year following decline. Domain 
reduction was measured as the number of 4-digit SIC codes 
dropped by a firm in each year following decline. Data for 
these measures were gathered from two sources, Dun & 
Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory and Standard & Poor's 
Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives.
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Cost, asset, and strategic change variables were 
operationalized as the percentage change from a base year. 
These data were then analyzed using cluster analysis to 
derive strategy clusters.10 Four major clusters 
corresponding with the four turnaround strategies were 
anticipated to provide the best data fit, although smaller 
clusters were also possible because a firm could implement a 
"status quo" or a combination strategy (Hambrick & Schecter, 
1983; Hofer, 1980, Stanwick, 1992).
When clustering analyzing strategy variables and TMG 
variables (discussed below), both hierarchical and 
nonhierarchical methods were employed to overcome potential 
problems associated with each method (Milligan, 1980).
First, the data were analyzed using Ward's method, which has 
been found to outperform other hierarchical clustering 
methods (Punj & Stewart, 1983). Because hierarchical 
methods generally suffer from problems such as poor initial 
combinations persisting throughout an analysis (i.e., poor 
early combinations of observations are not reassigned later 
in an analysis), Ward's method was used only to establish 
the number of clusters, derive cluster centers, and 
eliminate outliers (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992).
Second, after determining the number of clusters with 
Ward's method (discussed below), a non-hierarchical 
clustering method was employed. Specifically, the FASTCLUS 
procedure available in SAS was employed fSAS User's Guide;
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Statistics. 1985) The cluster centroids from Ward's method 
were used as seed points for the FASTCLUS procedure. 
Employing FASTCLUS permits cluster assignments to be "fine- 
tuned" by allowing firms to switch cluster membership (Hair 
et al., 1992).
A major issue in cluster analysis involves selection of 
a stopping rule to determine an appropriate number of 
clusters. Two stopping rules, change in the pseudo t2 
statistic and visual inspection of tree diagrams, were 
employed (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; SAS Institute, 
1985; Hair et al., 1992). The pseudo t2 is closely related 
to the Je(2)/Je(l) statistic (Duda & Hart, 1973) , which has 
been shown to derive accurate estimates of the number of 
clusters in a data set (Milligan & Cooper, 1985). Visual 
inspection of tree diagrams was used to support the findings 
of the pseudo t2 statistic.
TMG Measures
TMG variables were chosen to reflect characteristics 
posited to affect a TMG's ability to implement turnaround 
strategies. TMG measures were collected from Dun & 
Bradsteet's Directory of Corporate Management. Standard & 
Poor's Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives. 
Who's Who in Finance and Industry, as well as 10-K financial 
reports and proxy statements for the following variables: 
dominant functional background, company tenure, industry
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tenure, industry experience, and percentage of stock 
ownership.
This dissertation defined a TMG as managers holding 
positions in the top two levels of firm's management 
hierarchy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). This definition 
included the following top executive positions: Chairman, 
CEO, President, and Chief Operating Officer (COO). It also 
included the most senior level of vice presidents in a 
company, which consisted of the following positions: 
Executive Vice President, Senior Vice President, or Vice 
President. This definition permitted classifying TMGs 
across firms that had similar degrees of responsibility 
within their respective firms because managers in the top 
two levels were included even when the titles associated 
with those levels varied across firms (Wiersema & Bantel,
1993) .
Percentage of stock ownership was measured as the 
number of shares held by a TMG divided by total shares 
outstanding. This measure, therefore, does not include TMG 
stock options for additional shares of stock. Options were 
excluded because estimating the value of options requires 
crude guesses on such variables as future interest rates, 
opportunity costs of holding stock options, and future stock 
prices (Gomez-Mejia, 1994).
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Environmental Measures
Environmental measures were chosen to reflect 
dimensions posited to affect turnaround. Data were 
collected from COMPUSTAT for the following variables: 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity. These variables were 
measured at the three-digit level in COMPUSTAT (Keats &
Hitt, 1988).
Munificence was measured using average growth rates of 
net sales, employment, and operating income in a firm's 
primary industry (Dess & Beard, 1984). These growth rates 
were measured between a firm's decline and its turnaround 
for successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline 
and the end of the focal timeframe for continuously 
declining firms. Keats and Hitt (1988) adapted Dess and 
Beard's (1984) environmental measures so that data could be 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. Following Keats and Hitt (1988), 
each growth rate was measured as the antilog of the 
regression slope coefficient from the following regression 
equation:
y = bo + b,t + at
where
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Dynamism was measured as the instability of growth 
rates in net sales, employment, operating income in a firm's 
primary industry (Dess & Beard, 1984). This instability was 
measured between a firm's decline and its turnaround for 
successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline and 
the end of the focal timeframe for continuously declining 
firms. Following Keats and Hitt (1988), instability was 
measured as the antilog of the standard error of each 
regression slope coefficient from the above regression 
equation.
Complexity was measured as the concentration ratio of a 
firm's industry between a firm's decline and its turnaround 
for successful turnaround firms or between a firm's decline 
and the end of the study's timeframe for continuously 
declining firms. Concentration was measured as the 
aggregated market share of the largest four firms in a 
firm's primary industry. Higher levels of this variable 
indicate decreased complexity because large firms have more 
control in an industry (Porter, 1980; Scherer, 1980). All 
measures were taken from COMPUSTAT.
Performance Measures
As noted, performance was measured in three ways.
First, a firm's profitability was measured using its return 
on invested capital, which was computed as the ratio of a 
firm's income before extraordinary items and interest 
expense divided by the sum of common equity, preferred
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stock, minority interest, and long-term debt. Second, a 
firm's available slack was measured using its quick ratio, 
which was computed as the sum of cash, marketable 
securities, and accounts receivable divided by current 
liabilities. Third, potential slack was measured using a 
firm's debt/equity ratio. All measures were taken from 
COMPUSTAT. All three performance measures were calculated 
as a percentage change from the base year. Additionally, as 
previously noted, profitability was also measured as a 
percentage of the risk free rate, which provides an absolute 
anchor for performance comparisons.
Because this dissertation is the first turnaround study 
to employ slack as a dependent variable, it needed to assess 
the construct validity of the proposed slack measures. 
Construct validity was tested by assessing dimensionality, 
as well as testing convergent and predictive validities 
(Kerlinger, 1986; Venkatraman & Grant, 1986).
To assess dimensionality, performance and environmental 
characteristics variables were factor analyzed. Performance 
variables were expected to load highly on two dimensions 
corresponding to profitability and slack. Additionally, two 
environmental constructs (i.e., munificence and dynamism) 
had multiple measures. These measures were expected to load 
highly on two dimensions corresponding to munificence and 
dynamism.
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Construct validity was also assessed by testing 
convergent and predictive validities (Venkatraman & Grant, 
1986). To check convergent validity, the proposed slack 
measures were compared to other theoretical measures of 
slack. First, the quick ratio, which measures a firm's 
liquid resources, was compared with a firm's retained 
earnings, which provides another measure of available slack 
(Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). A positive correlation was 
expected between these two measures.
Second, a firm's debt to equity ratio, which measures 
resources available from the environment, was compared with 
a firm's price/earnings ratio, which provides another 
measure of potential slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). A 
negative correlation was expected between these two 
measures. All measures were taken from COMPUSTAT and 
Moody's Industrial Reports.
To assess predictive validity, the performance measures 
were compared with measures of slack that reflect decline 
outcomes. One such measure is a firm's dividend payout 
rate. This measure gauges a firm's available slack 
(Bourgeois, 1981), but because TMGs are often hesitant to 
adjust dividend payout rates until financial conditions 
decline dramatically, this measure may not change until 
after a firm has already experienced decline. Thus, 
comparing a firm's quick ratio during decline with its 
dividend payout rate after decline should serve as a measure
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of predictive validity. To assess predictive validity, each 
firm’s quick ratio was compared to its dividend payout 
lagged one year to allow for this delay in adjusting a 
dividend payout rate. A positive correlation was expected 
between these two measures.
Another slack measure which may change following 
decline is a firm's credit rating. Credit agencies (e.g., 
Standard & Poors and Moody's) may adjust a firm's rating, 
but again, these changes may not occur until after a firm 
experiences decline. This measure gauges a firm's potential 
slack (Bourgeois, 1981). Thus, comparing a firm's 
debt/equity ratio during decline with its credit rating 
after decline should serve as a measure of predictive 
validity. To assess predictive validity, each firm's debt 
to equity ratio was compared to its credit rating lagged one 
year to allow time for credit agencies to adjust a firm's 
rating. A negative correlation between these measures was 
expected. These measures were taken from COMPUSTAT, Moody's 
Industrial Reports and Moody's Bond Record.
Control Variables
Severity. A firm's decline severity may also affect 
its turnaround efforts. In general, a firm facing a severe 
decline in its operating health may have a more difficult 
time recovering because it lacks the resources to implement 
a turnaround effort (Barker, 1992; Ramanujam, 1984).
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To control for decline severity, Altman's (1988) Z- 
score was employed. This measure, which has been used in 
previous turnaround research (e.g., Barker, 1992; Stanwick, 
1992), gauges the probability that a firm will declare 
bankruptcy in the short term.11 A firm's Z-score is 
defined as follows:
z. = 0.012X, + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.0065^ + 0.999Xg
where
X̂  = working capital/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total 
liabilities 
Xg = sales/total assets 
Z = overall index
Firm Size. The organizational literature suggests two 
possible relationships between firm size and turnaround. 
First, larger firms may have more resources to commit to 
overcoming decline and, thus, may recover more quickly. 
Alternatively, larger firms may fall victim to inertia and 
not adjust in time to stave of decline (Morrow & Busenitz, 
1993; Pant, 1986; Ramanujam, 1984). Thus, size may affect a 
firm's turnaround effort. Finn size was operationalized as 
a firm's average sales during the focal timeframe.
Market share. The impact of market share on a firm's 
turnaround effort has also been discussed in previous
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turnaround studies (Arogyaswamy et al., 1994; Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983, Hofer, 1980). A firm with a high market 
share that experiences decline may have more options than 
one in a weak position. This measure was operationalized as 
a firm's average market share in its primary line of 
business during the study's timeframe.12
Management Turnover. Management turnover may also 
affect a firm's turnaround efforts. As noted, however, the 
performance effect of management turnover in troubled 
organizations remains ambiguous (Furtado & Karan, 1990; 
Kesner & Sebora, 1994). This measure was operationalized as 
the percentage of TMG members who remained with a firm from 
the beginning of its decline until its turnaround for 
successful turnaround firms or between the beginning of its 
decline until the end of the focal timeframe for 
continuously declining firms.
Analysis
Hypotheses 1, 2a through 2e, and 3a through 3c predict 
that turnaround strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and 
environmental factors will each affect turnaround.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms whose TMGs implement 
retrenchment strategies will outperform those that do not 
retrench. To test this hypothesis, firms were classified 
according to their turnaround strategy. Firms implementing 
retrenchment strategies following decline were compared to 
firms that did not retrench following decline. An analysis
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of variance was performed comparing turnaround across the 
three strategies (i.e., retrenchment, domain offense, domain 
creation).
In studying the effects of strategy on turnaround, both 
measures of performance (i.e., profitability and slack) were 
examined because no theoretical basis can be offered to 
predict which turnaround measure will be associated more 
with a turnaround strategy. Both measures of performance 
were similarly employed in the remaining hypotheses.
Hypotheses 2a through 2c predict that interaction 
between TMG characteristics and specific turnaround 
strategies is positively associated with turnaround. To 
test these hypotheses, TMGs were classified according to 
White et al.'s (1994) three career-orientation 
specializations. TMG data were collected for TMG members in 
charge of a firm for at least two years prior to the firm's 
turnaround for successful turnaround firms or for at least 
two years prior to the last year of the focal timeframe for 
continuously declining firms.
To determine TMG specialization, each TMG member was 
classified as having either a core, administrative, or 
environmental specialization based on his/her career 
background. Coding this information was relatively straight 
forward (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).13 Next, the percentage 
of TMG members falling into each classification was computed 
for each firm. Firms were then cluster analyzed following
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the two-step clustering process detailed above. A three- 
cluster solution was expected to best fit the data.
Hypothesis 2d predicts that TMG stock ownership is 
significantly related to performance. This hypothesis was 
analyzed using multiple regression. Separate equations were 
run to measure the effect of independent variables on each 
measure of performance as follows:
Performance = Control Variables + Average Stock 
Ownership
where
Performance = ROIC, Debt/Equity, or Quick ratio
Control
Variables = Decline Severity, Firm Size, Market
Share, Percentage of Management 
Turnover
Average Stock
Ownership = Average TMG stock ownership
following a firm's decline 
Hypothesis 2e predicts that because of different 
possible motives (Eisenhardt, 1989), TMG stock ownership 
will have a greater impact on the efficacy of a domain- 
creation strategy than on the other turnaround strategies. 
This hypothesis was analyzed using subgroup analysis. To 
test this hypothesis, firms were classified according to 
turnaround strategy implemented. Then the correlation 
between the percentage of TMG stock ownership and
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performance was determined for each strategy, and Fisher's 
z.-test was employed to test for significant differences 
across correlations.
Hypotheses 3a through 3c predict that environmental 
factors will have a significant impact on performance.
These hypotheses were analyzed employing multiple 
regression. Separate equations were run to measure the 
effect of independent variables on each measure of 
performance as follows:
Performance = Control Variables + Munificence +
Dynamism + Complexity
where
Performance = ROIC, Debt/Equity, or Quick ratio
Control
Variables = Decline Severity, Firm Size, Market
Share
Munificence = Sales Growth + Employment Growth
Dynamism = Variability in Sales Growth +
Variability in Employment Growth 
Complexity = Aggregate market share of largest
four companies in a firm's primary 
industry
Hypotheses 4a through 4c, 5a through 5c, and 6a through 
6c predict that TMG characteristics-strategy interactions 
will moderate the effect of environmental factors on 
performance. These hypotheses, therefore, integrate
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strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment. They were 
tested using subgroup analysis. Firms were first classified 
according to the turnaround strategy implemented. Next, 
firms were classified according to TMG career orientation. 
For each orientation, the correlation between the change in 
environmental factors and performance was determined, and 
Fisher's z.-test was employed to test for significant 
differences across correlations.
Summary
This chapter has addressed methodological issues 
related to testing hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. First, 
issues related to sample selection using the COMPUSTAT data 
base were highlighted. Next, issues related to employing 
slack as a measure of performance were detailed. 
Additionally, measures of strategy, TMG characteristics, 
environmental dimensions, and performance were presented. 
Finally, methods for testing each hypothesis as well as 
issues related to cluster analysis were discussed. The 
results of these tests are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter reports preliminary analyses investigating 
the validities of the proposed measures and cluster analyses 
of strategy and TMG variables. It then presents results for 
tests examining each stated hypothesis.
Preliminary Analyses
This section presents the results of preliminary 
analyses to establish the validity of the proposed 
performance and environmental measures. It also presents 
results from cluster analyses of strategy and TMG variables. 
Correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 
5.1. In addition, a list of industries and firms in the 
sample are shown in Table 5.2.
Note that preliminary analysis showed that three 
variables, Size, Market Share and Average Stock Ownership, 
had skewed distributions. These variables, therefore, were 
transformed by taking the natural logarithm of each. 
Correlations and descriptive statistics reflect these 
transformations.
Validities
To establish the construct validity of variables with 
multiple measures, factor analysis was employed. Construct 
validity was assessed for performance measures and 
environmental measures.
First, to determine the dimensionality of performance 
measures, a factor analysis with a varimax rotation was
90





















1. P&E .20 .56
2. Employees -.12 .43 .44
3. Inventory .14 .60 .42
4. SGA .32 .77 .48
5. Dom. initiative .36 .51 .10
6. Dom. reduction -.28 .37 .26
7. Strategy" .33
TMG
8. Number of mgrs. 3.81 1.83 .06
9. Specialization" -.14
10. Stock ownership 1.17 2.21 .04
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
04 .02 .05 .21 .07 -.08 .01 -.06 -.04
19 -.12 -.08 -.15 -.18 .03 -.28 .17 -.06
11 -.13 -.13 .04 .00 -.02 -.10 -.09 CM©•1
03 -.18 -.22 -.22 -.03 -.05 -.15 .40 -.20
09 -.29 -.23 -.28 -.04 -.03 -.29 .24 -.19
09 .26 -.04 .01 .11 .13 .07 -.17 -.06
07 -.11 -.20 -.13 .02 -.09 .03 -.08 .25
03 .04 .00 .05 .08 -.10 .01 -.07 .06
02 .11 .05 .12 .08 -.10 .06 .01 .04
20 .25 .07 .28 .06 .15 .23 -.14 .09




















Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Environment
11. Munificence .02
12. Dynamism -.06 .19
13. Complexity .13 .13 .23
Control
14. Size -.37 -.02 .03 -.13
15. Market Share -.32 -.03 .26 .32 .26
16. Severity .33 .02 -.05 .29 -.15 -.04
17. Mgt. turnover -.13 .07 -.15 .13 .01 .02 .20
Performance
18. Profitability -.13 -.12 -.05 -.06 .19 .14 -.00 -.17
19. Profitability/ 
risk-free -.07 -.05 .02 -.05 .04 -.02 .02 -.12 .63
20. Available slack -.05 .05 -.07 .07 .03 .00 .04 -.15 .06 .08
21. Potential slack -.14 -.02 -.06 .04 .28 .13 -.12 .15 .12 -.02 -.22
Note: n=119 except for Potential Slack where n=lll as well as Stock Ownership and Mgt.
Turnover where n=99. All correlations greater than ±.18 are significant at e <.05 except 
for correlations with Potential Slack, Stock Ownership and Management Turnover where 
correlations greater than ±.19 are significant at pc.05.
8 These are nominal variables. Thus, means and standard deviations are not meaningful.
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Table 5.2— Firms in Sample
Industry Code Company
2092 Farmer Brothers 
2200 Concord Fabrics Inc.
Dixie Yarn 
2211 Crown Crafts Inc.
2221 Texfi Industries 






2390 Decorator Industries 
2421 La-Pacific Corporation 
2531 Douglas & Lomason 
2621 Boise Cascade Corp.
Champion International 
International Paper 
Pope & Talbot Inc. 
Potlach Corporation 
Willamette Industries 
2670 Bemis Company 
2721 Playboy Enterprises 
2732 Courier Corporation 
2810 ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc.
NL Industries 
2821 Goodrich (BF) Company 
2860 Union Carbide 
2890 Hercules Inc.
2911 Crown Central Petroleum 
Murphy Oil Corporation 
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
2990 Triangle Corporation 
3080 Hanna (MA) Company 
3089 Kerr Group Inc.
3140 Suave Shoe Corporation 
Wellco Enterprises 
3310 Matec Corporation
National Standard Co. 
3312 Armco Inc.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Inland Steel Inc. 
Keystone Consolidated 
Laclede Steel 




3442 Instrument Systems Corp.
3443 Mueller (Paul) Company 
Pitt-Des Moines Inc.
3460 Fansteel Inc.
3470 Kinark Corporation 
3490 Intermagnetics General 
3523 Art's Way Manufacturing
3531 JLG Industries Inc. 
Portec Inc.
3532 Joy Technologies Inc.
3540 Salem Corporation
3541 Cincinnati Milacron Inc. 
Gleason Corporation 
Monarch Machine Tool Co.
3559 Katy Industries
3560 Dresser Industries Inc. 
Graham Corporation 
Ingersoll-Rand Company
3561 Duriron Company Inc.
3562 Timken Company
3567 Bethlehem Corporation
3570 Data General Corporation





3585 Continental Material 
Fedders Corporation 
Kysor Industrial Corp. 
3612 Thermo Voltek Corp.
Waters Instruments Inc. 
3621 Kollmorgen Corporation 
3640 Aztec Manufacturing Co. 
ILC Technology 
Lamson & Sessions Co. 
3651 Zenith Electronics Corp. 
3661 Cognitronics Corporation 
General Datacom Ind. 
Plantronics Inc.
3663 Adage Inc.
General Instrument Corp. 
Pico Products Inc.
(Table con'd)









3678 Robinson Nugent Inc.
3679 Applied Magnetics 
Computer Products Inc. 
Espey Mfg & Electronic
3690 Arrow Automotive
3711 Chrysler Corporation 
Ford Motor Company 
General Motors Corp. 
Navistar International
3714 Trico Products Corp.
3716 Winnebago Industries
3724 Sifco Industries 
UNC Inc.
3790 Kit Mfg.
3812 Anaren Microwave 
LaBarge Inc.
3821 Autoclave Engineers
Gelman Sciences Inc. 
Kewaunee Scientific
3823 Daniel Industries 












3844 American Sci. Eng.
3845 Circon Corp. 
Datascope Corp.
3861 Polaroid Corp.
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conducted. A varimax rotation was employed to simplify the 
factor matrix and facilitate interpretation (Hair et al.f 
1992). The results sure shown in Table 5.3.
Results in Table 5.3 show that two factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained (Kaiser, 1970). 
Measures of profitability loaded highly on Factor 1, and 
slack measures loaded highly on Factor 2. The negative 
loading for available slack also conforms with expectations 
because the slack measures employed should be negatively 
correlated (i.e., an increase in the potential slack 
measure, debt to equity, indicates a decrease in overall 
slack). These results provide evidence that the proposed 
profitability and slack variables measure distinct 
constructs.14 Even though available and potential slack 
load on the same factor, they were analyzed separately 
because they have been found to have different effects on 
organizational outcomes (e.g., risk taking; Singh, 1986).
Construct validity for the proposed performance 
measures was also assessed by testing convergent and 
predictive validities (Venkatraman & Grant, 1986). To 
assess convergent validity, the proposed slack measures were 
compared to other theoretical measures of slack. First, the 
quick ratio, which measures a firm's liquid resources, was 
compared with a firm's retained earnings, which provides
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Table 5.3— Rotated Factor Pattern for Performance Measures
Factor 1 Factor 2
Profitability .8547 .1394
Pro fitab i1ity relative to 
risk free rate
.8729 -.1178
Available slack -.0517 -.7222
Potential slack -.0384 .8174
Eigenvalue 1.4984 1.2211
Proportion of variance .3746 .3053
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another measure of available slack (Bourgeois & Singh,
1983). A positive correlation of .3348 (pc.OOl) was found 
between these two measures. Although this correlation is 
not high (Nunnally, 1967), it is significant and positive as 
expected. Thus, it provides some evidence of convergent 
validity.
Second, a firm's debt to equity ratio, which measures 
environmental resource availability, was compared with a 
firm's price/earnings ratio, which provides another measure 
of potential slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). This 
correlation was not significant (r=.0897, e <.40), which may 
be due in part to the volatility of stock prices for 
distressed firms (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). Consequently, 
each firm's debt to equity ratio was compared to a second 
measure of potential slack, interest coverage ratio (Barker, 
1992; Bromiley, 1991). A firm's interest coverage ratio 
provides a measure of potential slack because firms having a 
high ratio can afford to take on additional debt. The 
correlation between these measures was -.2210 (p<.05). 
Although this correlation is not high (Nunnally, 1967), it 
is significant and negative as expected. Thus, it provides 
some evidence of convergent validity. All measures were 
taken from COMPUSTAT and Moody's Industrial Reports.
To assess predictive validity, the proposed performance 
measures were compared with measures of slack that reflect 
outcomes of decline. One such measure is a firm's dividend
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
payout ratio. To assess predictive validity, each firm's 
quick ratio was compared to its dividend payout lagged one 
year. The correlation between these measures approached 
significance (£= .1496, jjc.IO). Closer examination of the 
data, however, showed that over half (n = 67) the firms in 
the focal sample did not pay dividends during the focal 
timeframe. Removing these firms from the sample resulted in 
a correlation of .2201 (joe. 06). Although this correlation 
is not high (Nunnally, 1967), it approached significance and 
is positive as expected. Thus, it provides some evidence of 
predictive validity.
Another slack measure which may change following 
decline is a firm's credit rating. To assess predictive 
validity, each firm's debt to equity ratio was be compared 
to its credit rating lagged one year. A negative 
correlation between these measures was found (£ = -.1953, 
E<.50). This lack of significance may occur in part because 
only 19 firms in the sample had debt instruments rated by 
Moody's during the focal timeframe. The correlation, 
however, is in the hypothesized direction. These measures 
were taken from COMPUSTAT, Moody's Industrial Reports and 
Moody's Bond Record.
To establish the construct validity of the 
environmental variables, factor analysis was employed. The 
multiple measures of munificence and dynamism were analyzed 
using factor analysis with a varimax rotation. Three
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained 
(Kaiser, 1970). Sales growth and employment growth loaded 
highly on Factor 1. Operating income growth and operating 
income dynamism loaded highly on Factor 2 and appear to be 
tapping a construct unique to operating income. Sales 
dynamism and employment dynamism loaded highly on Factor 3. 
Because the operating income variables loaded on a single 
factor that is not theoretically meaningful to the current 
dissertation, they were removed and the remaining variables 
were factor analyzed again using a varimax rotation. The 
results are shown in Table 5.4.
Results in Table 5.4 show that two factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained (Kaiser, 1970). 
Measures of sales growth and employment growth loaded highly 
on Factor 1, whereas measures of sales dynamism and 
employment dynamism loaded highly on Factor 2. The two 
variables for each factor, therefore, were summed to create 
munificence and dynamism variables, respectively (Hair et 
al., 1992).
Cluster analysis
To classify firms by their respective turnaround 
strategies and TMGs by their respective career 
specializations, cluster analysis was employed. The 
following clustering procedures were performed for both 
strategy and TMG variables. To obtain an estimate of the 
number of clusters present in the data and to eliminate
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outliers (Hair et al., 1992), the data were analyzed using a 
hierarchical cluster analysis procedure, Ward's minimum 
variance method. To determine the number of clusters, two 
stopping rules, change in pseudo t2 statistic and visual 
inspection of tree diagrams were employed (Aldenderfer & 
Blashfield, 1984; Hair et al., 1992; SAS Institute, 1985). 
These stopping rules indicated that a four-cluster solution 
provided a good fit for the strategy data and a three- 
cluster solution provided a good fit for the TMG data. Both 
solutions are also in line with the number of clusters 
expected from a priori theory (cf. Ketchen & Shook, in 
press).
To examine the validity of the resulting cluster 
solutions, reliability was examined by randomly splitting 
the sample into two subgroups (Ketchen & Shook, in press). 
These subgroups were cluster analyzed, and the resulting 
clusters were then compared with the full sample to assess 
stability of cluster assignments and make sure the 
clustering techniques were not taking advantage of random 
variation (Hair et al., 1992). The average agreement of 
subgroups with the original sample was .79 for the strategy 
clusters and .73 for the TMG clusters. Both of these 
results indicate that cluster assignments were highly 
reliable (Nunnally, 1967).
To overcome problems with hierarchical cluster analysis 
discussed above, the cluster centroids from this
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hierarchical analysis were then input into an iterative 
clustering procedure, FASTCLUS, to refine cluster 
assignments. Means for the resulting four strategy clusters 
and three TMG clusters are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, 
respectively.
Table 5.5 shows that three clusters correspond to the 
strategy hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. Examining the 
mean values to name the clusters indicated that firms in 
cluster 1 implemented a domain offense strategy, firms in 
cluster 2 implemented a retrenchment strategy, and firms in 
cluster 4 implemented a domain creation strategy. Firms in 
cluster 3 appear to have implemented a hybrid strategy 
combining domain offense and domain creation. The three 
strategies corresponding to the hypotheses were retained for 
analysis.
Table 5.6 shows that each of three clusters had a 
dominant TMG specialization. Examining the mean values to 
name the clusters indicated that TMGs in cluster 1 had a 
core specialization, TMGs in cluster 2 had an administrative 
specialization, and TMGs in cluster 3 had an environmental 
specialization. The average TMG size was 3.81 members 
(sd=l.83).
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis states that firms following a 
retrenchment strategy would outperform those following other 
turnaround strategies. Restated formally:
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HI: Firms implementing retrenchment strategies
(i.e., an efficiency strategy or a domain- 
consolidation strategy) following a 
performance decline will outperform firms 
implementing a domain-offense or a domain- 
creation strategy.
To determine each firm's turnaround strategy, firms 
were classified employing the two-step cluster analysis 
method described above. Hypothesis 1 was tested using 
ANOVA. A significant E-statistic would indicate that 
systematic performance differences exist across turnaround 
strategies. Results are shown in Table 5.7. When testing 
all hypotheses, performance measures greater than three 
standard deviations from the mean were removed.15
Results in Table 5.7 do not support Hypothesis 1. No 
significant differences in performance were found across 
turnaround strategies for any performance measure. Thus, 
the hypothesis that firms implementing a retrenchment 
strategy would outperform firms implementing a domain- 
offense or domain-creation strategy was not supported.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis states that the interaction 
between TMG characteristics and a firm's turnaround strategy 
has implications for performance. These TMG characteristics 
include both specialization and stock ownership.
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Table 5.5— Cluster Analysis for Strategy Variables
Cluster Means
n p &e Inv Emp SGA DI DR
1 70 .26 .20 -.11 .24 .09 -.08
2 48 -.23 -.35 -.44 -.25 .49 -.58
3 12 2.56 1.73 1.02 2.36 .51 -.54
4 26 .79 .96 .37 1.43 .64 -.16
P&E= Plant & equipment 
Inv= Inventory 
Emp= Employees 
SGA= Sales, general, and 
DI = Domain initiative 
DR = Domain reduction
administrative expenses
Table 5 .6— Cluster Analysis for TMG Variables
Cluster Means 
(standard deviations)
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Table 5.7 — Performance Differences 
Turnaround Strategies
Among
df Mean Square Z Pr>£
Profitability













Model 2 1.21 2.04 .14
Error 90 .59
Total 92
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Hypotheses 2a through 2c state that firms whose TMGs 
have specializations that match particular turnaround 
strategies will outperform firms whose TMGs do not have this 
match. Restated formally:
H2a: Firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMGs have a core-function specialization will 
outperform those firms whose TMGs have 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specializations.
H2b: Firms implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMGs have an administrative-function 
specialization will outperform those firms whose 
TMGs have core- or environmental-function 
specializations.
H2c: Firms implementing a domain-creation strategy 
whose TMGs have an environmental-function 
specialization will outperform those firms whose 
TMGs have core- or administrative-function 
specializations.
To determine each firm's TMG orientation, TMGs were 
classified employing the two-step cluster analysis method 
described above. Hypothesis 2a through 2c were then tested 
using ANOVA. A significant F-statistic would indicate that 
systematic performance differences exist across TMG 
specializations for each turnaround strategy. Next, because 
dividing three TMG specializations by three strategies
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resulted in small cell sizes (i.e., mean cell sizes were 
13.3, 16.2, and 7.2 for retrenchment, domain offense, and 
domain creation, respectively), hypotheses 2a through 2c 
were also tested by performing contrasts between the 
hypothesized highest performing specialization and the other 
two specializations.
First, these hypotheses were tested using ANOVA.
Results are shown in Tables 5.8 through 5.10.
Results in Table 5.8 do not support Hypothesis 2a. No 
significant differences in performance were found across TMG 
specializations for firms implementing a retrenchment 
strategy. Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs having a core 
specialization will be able to implement a retrenchment 
strategy better than TMGs with either an administrative or 
environmental specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.9 do not support Hypothesis 2b. No 
significant differences in performance were found across TMG 
specializations for firms implementing a domain offense 
strategy. Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs having an 
administrative specialization will be able to implement a 
domain offense strategy better than TMGs with either a core 
or environmental specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.10 do not support Hypothesis 2c.
Only differences in potential slack approach significance 
(E<.10) across TMG specializations for firms implementing a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Table 5.8— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Retrenchment Strategy
df Mean Square £ Pr>£
Profitability













Model 2 .09 .10 .90
Error 32 .88
Total 34
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Table 5.9— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Offense Strategy
df Mean Square F Pr>F
Profitability













Model 2 .00 .01 .99
Error 40 .17
Total 42
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Table 5.10— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Creation Strategy
M Mean Square 2 Pr>£
Profitability













Model 2 1.24 2.68 .10
Error 17 .46
Total 19
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domain creation strategy. Examining group means using 
Duncan's Multiple Range Test, however, shows that an 
administrative specialization outperforms both core and 
environmental specializations (p<.10). These results aire 
contrary to Hypothesis 2c.
One explanation for lack of significant performance 
difference in the above hypotheses may be the small cell 
sizes for each strategy after dividing by TMG 
specialization. Therefore, contrasts were performed between 
the hypothesized highest performing specialization and the 
other two specializations. Comparing specializations in 
this way allows the analysis to conserve one degree of 
freedom. Results of these contrasts are shown in Tables 5.11 
through 5.13.
Results in Table 5.11 again fail to support Hypothesis 
2a. No significant differences in performance were found 
across TMG specializations for firms implementing a 
retrenchment strategy (Only contrasts between core and other 
specializations are shown). Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs 
having a core specialization will be able to implement a 
retrenchment strategy better than TMGs with either an 
administrative or environmental specialization was not 
supported.
Results in Table 5.12 do not support Hypothesis 2b. 
First, an environmental specialization outperformed other
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Table 5.11— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Retrenchment Strategy
df Z Pr>£
Profitabi1ity 
Core vs Others 1 .00 .99
Profitability/ 
Risk Free
Core vs Others 1 .02 .90
Available Slack 
Core vs Others 1 .03 .85
Potential Slack 
Core vs Others 1 .03 .87
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Table 5.12— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Offense Strategy
df Z Pr>E
Profitability
Administrative vs Others 1 1.08 .31
Environmental vs Others 1 3.90 .06
Pro f i tab i 1 i ty/
Risk Free
Administrative vs Others 1 .11 .75
Core vs Others 1 4.47 .04
Available Slack
Administrative vs Others 1 .87 .36
Potential Slack
Administrative vs Others 1 .01 .91
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Table 5.13— Performance Differences Among TMG
Specializations for Domain Creation Strategy
d£ Z Pr>£
Profitability
Environmental vs Others 1 .01 .93
Profitability/
Risk Free
Environmental vs Others 1 1.67 .21
Available Slack
Environmental vs Others 1 1.20 .29
Administrative vs Others 1 3.32 .08
Potential Slack
Environmental vs Others 1 .35 .56
Administrative vs Others 1 4.57 .05
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specializations in terms of profitability (p<.lO). This 
finding is counter to Hypothesis 2b. Results also show that 
an administrative and an environmental specialization 
outperform a core specialization in terms of profitability 
relative to the risk-free rate. Duncan's Multiple Range 
Test shows that an administrative specialization outperforms 
a core specialization on this measure (e < .10). Thus, the 
hypothesis that TMGs having an administrative specialization 
will be able to implement a domain offense strategy better 
than TMGs with either a core or environmental specialization 
was not supported.
Results in Table 5.13 show that significant differences 
exist across specializations for firms implementing a domain 
creation strategy. Contrary to expectations, however, an 
administrative specialization outperformed the other two 
specializations in terms of potential slack (p<.05) and 
available slack (e <.10). Thus, the hypothesis that TMGs 
having an environmental specialization will be able to 
implement a domain creation strategy better than TMGs with 
either a core or administrative specialization was not 
supported.
Hypotheses 2d and 2e state that TMG stock ownership 
will affect the successful implementation of a turnaround 
strategy. Hypothesis 2d states that TMG stock ownership 
will be positively related to turnaround. Restated 
formally:
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£12d: There will be a positive relation between TMG 
stock ownership and performance in declining 
firms.
Hypothesis 2d was tested using multiple regression. 
Stock data were available for 99 firms. Initial 
investigation showed that Average Market Share, a control 
variable, was not significantly related to performance in 
any analysis. Therefore, this variable was excluded from 
the analysis and the regression equations were reestimated. 
Results are shown in Table 5.14.
Results in Table 5.14 show that average stock ownership 
is significantly related to potential slack (p<.05) and 
approaches significance with available slack (pc.lO). 
Contrary to expectations, however, TMG stock ownership is 
negatively related to performance for both slack measures. 
First, stock ownership is positively associated with the 
measure for potential slack, a firm's debt to equity ratio. 
Thus, the higher a TMG's average stock ownership, the more a 
firm's debt load increased, and, in turn, the more a firm's 
slack decreased. Second, stock ownership is negatively 
related to the measure for available slack, a firm's 
liquidity ratio. Thus, the higher a TMG's average stock 
ownership, the more a firm's liquidity decreased, and, in 
turn, the more a firm's slack decreased. Both these results 
are counter to Hypothesis 2d.
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Hypothesis 2e states that the positive relation between 
stock ownership and performance will be stronger for firms 
implementing a domain creation strategy. Restated formally:
H2e: There will be a stronger positive relation between 
stock ownership and turnaround for declining firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy than for 
firms implementing either a domain-offense or 
retrenchment strategy.
This hypothesis was tested using subgroup analysis. 
First, firms were classified by turnaround strategy 
implemented. Then for each strategy, the correlation 
between average stock ownership and performance was 
computed. Fisher's z.-test was employed to test for 
significant differences across correlations (Bruning &
Kintz, 1987). Results are shown in Table 5.15.
Results in Table 5.15 do not support Hypothesis 2e. No 
significant differences in the correlation between stock 
ownership and performance occur across strategies. Thus, 
the hypothesis that there will be a stronger positive 
relation between TMG stock ownership and performance for 
firms implementing a domain creation strategy than for firms 
implementing other strategies is not supported.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis states that a firm's environment 
will impact its turnaround. Restated formally:
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Table 5.14— Relation Between Stock Ownership and Performance
Profitability/ 
Profitability Risk Free
Variables b SE b SE
Intercept .07 1.53 1.11 1.07
Size .43* .21 .04 .15
Management Turnover -1.90* .84 -1.11* .60
Severity -.09 .79 .90 .57




Variables b SE b
Intercept .21 .34 -1.3 3** .53
Size -.02 .04 .20** .07
Management Turnover -.15 .19 .74** .29
Severity .15 .17 -.22 .27
Average Stock Ownership -.08* .04 .13* .07
R2 .05 .10*
* E < .10, * £ < .05, E < •01
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Table 5.15— Correlations and Differences in Correlations 
Between Stock Ownership and Performance 
for Different Turnaround Strategies
Performance Measure Stock Ownership
Retrenchment
Profitability (n=32) .14
Profitability/Risk Free (n=28) -.24
Available Slack (n=34) -.10
Potential Slack (n=31) .07
Domain Offense
Profitability (n=37) -.01
Profitability/Risk Free (n=41) -.13
Available Slack (n=44) -.20
Potential Slack (n=38) .00
Domain Creation
Profitability (n=18) -.24 -.24
Profitability/Risk Free (n=19) .01 .01
Available Slack (n=17) -.15 -.15
Potential Slack (n=17) .08 .08
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
p<.05.
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Variables b SE b SE
Intercept 3.86* 1.83 2.00 1.28
Severity .26 .63 .61 .45
Size .06 .15 .10 .10
Munificence -.06 .03 -.02 .02
Dynamism .40* .20 -.03 .14






Variables b SE b SE
Intercept -.29 .41 .03 .54
Severity .02 .15 -.14 .19
Size .03 .03 .04 .04
Munificence .01 .01 -.01 .Cl
Dynamism .01 .04 .01 .06
Complexity .00 .00 -.00 .01
R2 .02 .05
+ E < .10, * p < .05, ** E < -01
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g3a: Environmental munificence will be positively 
related to performance in declining firms.
H3b: Environmental dynamism will be negatively related 
to performance in declining firms.
33c: Environmental complexity will be negatively 
related to performance in declining firms.
Hypothesis 3a through 3c were tested using multiple 
regression. Again, initial analysis showed that Average 
Market Share was not significant in any equations.
Therefore, it was removed and regression equations were 
reestimated. Results are shown in Table 5.16.
Results in Table 5.16 show that the environmental 
variables have only a limited relation with performance for 
firms in a turnaround situation. Dynamism and complexity 
are significantly related only with profitability and both 
relations are opposite the ones hypothesized. Additionally, 
the amount of variance in profitability explained by 
environmental variables is relatively small (R^.09).
Thus, the hypotheses that environmental characteristics will 
impact turnaround received only limited support.
Hypotheses 4. 5. and 6
Hypotheses 4 through 6 seek to integrate concepts of 
turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental 
variables. Hypothesis 4 states that firms whose TMGs fit 
with a firm's strategy will be able to better capitalize on
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environmental munificence than firms whose TMGs do not have 
this fit with strategy. Restated formally:
H4a: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMG have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMG has either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H4b: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMG have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMG has 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H4c: Environmental munificence will be more
positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMG have an environmental-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMG has 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
Hypotheses 4 through 6 were tested using subgroup 
analysis. First, firms were classified by turnaround 
strategy implemented. Next, firms were classified by TMG
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career orientation. Then for each TMG-strategy combination, 
the correlation between each environmental characteristic 
and performance was computed. Fisher's z.-test was employed 
to test for significant differences across correlations 
(Bruning & Kintz, 1987). Results for Hypotheses 4a through 
4c are shown in Tables 5.17 through 5.19, respectively.
Results in Table 5.17 do not support Hypothesis 4a. No 
significant differences in the correlation between 
environmental munificence and performance occur across TMG 
specializations. Thus, the hypothesis that environmental 
munificence will be more positively related to turnaround 
for firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMG 
have a core-function specialization than for firms whose TMG 
has either an administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.18 provide mixed support for 
Hypothesis 4b. The correlation between environmental 
munificence and performance is significantly higher for an 
administrative versus environmental specialization and 
approaches significance (p<.10) for an administrative versus 
core specialization in terms of potential slack (Recall 
potential slack is reverse-scored). Thus, the hypothesis 
that environmental munificence will be more positively 
related to turnaround for firms implementing a domain 
offense strategy whose TMG have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMG has either a core-
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Table 5.17— Retrenchment Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Munificence and Performance 






























Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
E < . 10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
E< •05.
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Table 5.18— Domain Offense Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Munificence and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Munificence
Core
Profitability (n=21) -.14
Profitability/Risk Free (n=25) -.27
Available Slack (n=28) -.14
Potential Slack (n=25) .14
Administrative
Profitability (n=9) .38 .38
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) -.39 -.39
Available Slack (n=9) .06 .06
Potential Slack (n=9) -.54* -.54*
Environmental
Profitability (n=7) -.17
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) .08
Available Slack (n=10) -.41
Potential Slack (n=9) .30
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
E<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
E<.05.
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Table 5.19— Domain Creation Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Munificence and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Munificence
Core
Profitability (n=8) .74
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) .55
Available Slack (n=9) .03
Potential Slack (n=9) .02
Administrative
Profitability (n=4) -.39
Profitability/Risk Free (n=4) .31
Available Slack (n=5) .16
Potential Slack (n=5) .58
Environmental
Profitability (n=8) .71 .71
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) .64 .64
Available Slack (n=9) .11 .11
Potential Slack (n=5) .52 .52
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
p<.05.
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or environmental-function specialization received mixed 
support.
Results in Table 5.19 do not support Hypothesis 4c. No 
significant differences in the correlation between 
environmental munificence and performance occur across TMG 
specializations. Thus, the hypothesis that environmental 
munificence will be more positively related to turnaround 
for firms implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMG 
have an environmental-function specialization than for firms 
whose TMG has either a core or an administrative-function 
specialization was not supported.
Hypothesis 5 states that firms whose TMGs fit with a 
finn's strategy will be able to better cope with 
environmental dynamism than firms whose TMGs do not have 
this fit with strategy. Restated formally:
H5a: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMG have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMG has either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H5b: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMG have an administrative-function
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specialization than for firms whose TMG has 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H5c: Environmental dynamism will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMG have an environmental-function 
specialization them for firms whose TMG has 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
Results for these hypotheses are shown in Tables 5.20 
through 5.22.
Results in Table 5.20 do not support Hypothesis 5a.
The correlation between environmental dynamism and 
profitability for an administrative specialization is higher 
(p<.10) than for a core specialization. Thus, the 
hypothesis that environmental dynamism will be less 
negatively related to turnaround for firms implementing a 
retrenchment strategy whose TMG have a core-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMGs have either an 
administrative- or environmental-function specialization was 
not supported.
Results in Table 5.21 do not support Hypothesis 5b. No 
significant differences in the correlation between 
environmental dynamism and performance occur across TMG 
specializations. Thus, the hypothesis that environmental
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Table 5.20— Retrenchment Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Dynamism and Performance 






























Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
P < .05.
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Table 5.21— Domain Offense Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Dynamism and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Dynamism
Core
Profitability (n=21) .03
Profitability/Risk Free (n=25) .28
Available Slack (n=28) -.07
Potential Slack (n=25) .16
Administrative
Profitability (n=9) -.19 -.19
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) -.02 -.02
Available Slack (n=9) .25 .25
Potential Slack (n=9) .21 .21
Environmental
Profitability (n=7) -.33
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) -.35
Available Slack (n=10) -.37
Potential Slack (n=9) -.19
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
P<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
P<.05.
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Table 5.22— Domain Creation Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Dynamism and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Dynamism
Core
Profitability (n=8) .16
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) -.31
Available Slack (n=9) -.09
Potential Slack (n=9) .06
Administrative
Profitability (n=4) -.77
Profitability/Risk Free (n=4) .08
Available Slack (n=5) .25
Potential Slack (n=5) .23
Environmental
Profitability (n=8) .29 .29
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) .34 .34
Available Slack (n=9) .78* .78
Potential Slack (n=9) -.11 -.11
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
p < .05.
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dynamism will be less negatively related to turnaround for 
firms implementing a domain offense strategy whose TMG have 
an administrative-function specialization than for firms 
whose TMGs have either a core- or environmental-function 
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.22 provide mixed support for 
Hypothesis 5c. The correlation between environmental 
dynamism and available slack is significantly higher for an 
environmental specialization than for a core specialization. 
Thus, the hypothesis that environmental dynamism will be 
less negatively related to turnaround for firms implementing 
a domain-creation strategy whose TMG have an environmental- 
function specialization than for firms whose TMGs have 
either a core- or administrative-function specialization 
received mixed support.
Hypothesis 6 states that firms whose TMGs fit with a 
firm's strategy will be able to better cope with 
environmental complexity than firms whose TMGs do not have 
this fit with strategy. Restated formally:
H6a: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a retrenchment strategy whose 
TMG have a core-function specialization than 
for firms whose TMG has either an 
administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization.
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H6b: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related performance for firms 
implementing a domain-offense strategy whose 
TMG have an administrative-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMG has 
either an core- or environmental-function 
specialization.
H6c: Environmental complexity will be less
negatively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain-creation strategy whose 
TMG have an environmental-function 
specialization than for firms whose TMG has 
either a core- or administrative-function 
specialization.
Results for these hypotheses are shown in Table 5.23 
through 5.25.
Results in Table 5.23 do not support Hypothesis 6a.
The correlation between environmental complexity and 
potential slack was significantly higher for an 
administrative versus a core specialization in terms of 
potential slack (Both potential slack and complexity are 
reverse-scored). Thus, the hypothesis that environmental 
complexity will be less negatively related to turnaround for 
firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMG have a 
core-function specialization than for firms whose TMGs have
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Table 5.23— Retrenchment Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Complexity and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Complexity
Core
Profitability (n=10) -.23 -.23
Profitability/Risk Free (n=10) -.16 -.16
Available Slack (n=10) .10 .10
Potential Slack (n=10) -.36 -.36
Administrative
Profitability (n=ll) -.51
Profitability/Risk Free (n=10) -.15
Available Slack (n=12) -.31
Potential Slack (n=9) .57*
Environmental
Profitability (n=19) -.33
Profitability/Risk Free (n=18) -.40
Available Slack (n=20) -.01
Potential Slack (n=16) -.08
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
E<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
p<.05.
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Table 5.24— Domain Offense Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Complexity and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Complexity
Core
Profitability (n=26) -.25
Profitability/Risk Free (n=29) -.09
Available Slack (n=32) .04
Potential Slack (n=28) -.09
Administrative
Profitability (n=10) -.23 -.23
Profitability/Risk Free (n=ll) .18 .18
Available Slack (n=ll) -.08 -.08
Potential Slack (n=10) -.14 -.14
Environmental
Profitability (n=9) -.31
Profitability/Risk Free (n=9) .64
Available Slack (n=10) .17
Potential Slack (n=8) -.38
* Significance of differences in correlation pairs wasp<.10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
E<.05.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
Table 5.25— Domain Creation Strategy: 
Correlations and Differences in Correlations Between 
Environmental Complexity and Performance 
for Different TMG Specializations
Performance Measure Environmental Complexity
Core
Profitability (n=9) .45
Profitability/Risk Free (n=10) .46
Available Slack (n=9) .57
Potential Slack (n=9) -.49
Administrative
Profitability (n=4) .71
Profitability/Risk Free (n=4) .13
Available Slack (n=4) .75
Potential Slack (n=5) .58
Environmental
Profitability (n=9) -.22 -.22
Profitability/Risk Free (n=4) -.01 -.01
Available Slack (n=9) .75 .75
Potential Slack (n=6) -.63 -.63*
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was
p < .10.
Significance of differences in correlation pairs was 
p < .05.
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either an administrative- or environmental-function 
specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.24 do not support Hypothesis 6b. No 
significant differences in the correlation between 
environmental complexity and available slack occur across 
TMG specializations. Thus, the hypothesis that 
environmental complexity will be less negatively related to 
turnaround for firms implementing a domain-offense strategy 
whose TMG have an administrative-function specialization 
than for firms whose TMGs have either a core- or 
environmental function specialization was not supported.
Results in Table 5.25 do not support Hypothesis 6c.
The correlation between environmental complexity and 
available slack approached significance (p<.10) for an 
administrative specialization compared to an environmental 
specialization. Thus, the hypothesis that environmental 
complexity will be less negatively related to turnaround for 
firms implementing a domain-creation strategy whose TMG have 
an environmental-function specialization than for firms 
whose TMGs have either a core- or administrative- function 
specialization was not supported.
Summary
This chapter has presented the results of tests of the 
dissertation's hypotheses. The relation between turnaround 
strategy and turnaround was not significant. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. The importance of TMG-
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strategy interaction received mixed support. Results for 
Hypothesis 2c showed significant differences across TMG 
specializations, although this relation was opposite that 
hypothesized. Additionally, the relation between TMG stock 
ownership and performance was significant, but this relation 
was also opposite that hypothesized. Results for Hypotheses 
3a through 3c showed only a limited relation between 
environmental characteristics and performance. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3a through 3c were not supported. Finally, the 
combination of strategy, TMG characteristics, and 
environment showed a few significant relations with 
performance.
The next chapter discusses these results. It also 
draws implications for future turnaround research and 
discusses limitations of the present investigation. 
Additionally, the chapter offers suggestions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS AMD CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined unresolved issues related to 
organizational turnaround. To address these issues, it 
developed and tested a series of hypotheses that 
investigated the effects of turnaround strategy, TMG 
characteristics, and environment on turnaround. These 
components are critical in a firm's alignment and, thus, to 
its performance. Consequently, resolving issues in 
turnaround research required gaining insight into these 
factors affecting alignment.
This chapter discusses the results presented in Chapter 
5. First, it summarizes results from each hypothesis.
Based on these results, it presents implications for the 
role of turnaround strategy, TMG characteristics, and 
environment in organizational turnaround. Then, it 
discusses limitations of the present investigation.
Finally, the chapter outlines possible future research 
avenues.
Summary of results 
Hypothesis 1 examined the effect that turnaround 
strategy has on turnaround. Previous literature has focused 
on the efficacy of particular turnaround strategies and, to 
date, conflicting results have occurred. As noted, part of 
this ambiguity may exist because of previous studies have 
employed different classification schemes or they have used 
broad classification schemes that aggregate different
140
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strategies. To overcome these problems, the dissertation 
first developed a continuum of turnaround strategies based 
on previous studies of decline (Miles, 1982; Zammuto & 
Cameron, 1985). Next, firms were classified according to 
the strategy that they implemented, and performance was 
compared across strategies. Drawing from recent empirical 
turnaround studies, Hypothesis 1 stated that a retrenchment 
strategy would outperform both a domain offense and a domain 
creation strategy. This hypothesis was not supported. This 
finding suggests that other factors have to be considered 
along with turnaround strategy in studying how firms regain 
alignment and turn around.
Another factor impacting a firm's alignment is its TMG. 
Managers perform boundary-spanning functions between a 
firm's internal processes and its environment (Andrews,
1971; Child, 1972; Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & Mason,
1984) . Additionally, because TMG members have different 
skills, motives, and interpretations of organizational and 
environmental stimuli, they play a critical role in 
reestablishing alignment and turning a firm around. To 
date, however, investigation of a TMG's role has been 
limited to studying whether incumbent TMG members should be 
replaced by new managers following a performance decline 
(Furtado & Karan, 1990; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Thus, this 
dissertation is the first study to move beyond this limited
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focus to examine the role that TMG talents have in 
organizational turnaround.
Hypotheses 2a through 2c examined the role of a TMG's 
functional, company, and industry background has on its 
ability to implement particular turnaround strategies.
These hypotheses stated that a fit between TMG 
characteristics and turnaround strategy would lead to higher 
performance. Hypothesis 2a stated that firms implementing a 
retrenchment strategy whose TMGs had a core-function 
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other 
specializations. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b stated that firms implementing a domain 
offense strategy whose TMGs had an administrative-function 
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other 
specializations. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2c stated that firms implementing a domain 
creation strategy whose TMGs had an environmental-function 
specialization would outperform firms whose TMGs had other 
specializations. Contrary to expectations, firms whose TMGs 
had administrative-function specializations outperformed 
firms whose TMGs had other specializations.
Another characteristic that may affect TMG motives for 
implementing particular strategies is stock ownership.
Thus, Hypotheses 2d and 2e examined the relation between TMG 
stock ownership and turnaround. Hypothesis 2d stated that 
because increased TMG stock ownership can align a TMG's
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goals with stockholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), higher 
stock ownership would lead to increased performance.
Contrary to expectations, increased TMG stock ownership led 
to lower performance in terms of available and potential 
slack.
Additionally, because managers have an incentive to 
diversify to diffuse their employment risk in decline 
situations (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
the effect of TMG stock ownership may be most pronounced in 
the context of a domain creation strategy. Thus, Hypothesis 
2e stated that the relation between stock ownership and 
turnaround would be higher for firms implementing domain 
creation strategies than for firms implementing other 
strategies. This hypothesis was not supported.
A third component affecting a firm's alignment is the 
nature of the environment with which firms interact 
(Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). 
Previous turnaround research had investigated broad 
environmental characteristics such as industry growth rate 
(Ramanujam, 1984) or overall economic growth (Schendel et 
al., 1976). This dissertation moved beyond these narrow 
views of environment to investigate the effect of 
environmental munificence, dynamism, and complexity on 
turnaround. Hypothesis 3a through 3c stated that 
munificence would be positively related to turnaround,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
whereas dynamism and complexity would be negatively related 
to turnaround. None of these hypotheses was supported.
The above hypotheses investigated the individual 
effects of strategy, TMG-strategy interaction, and 
environment on turnaround. To provide a comprehensive view 
of the turnaround process, the dissertation also studied the 
combined effects of these variables. Thus, Hypotheses 4 
through 6 investigated the effects of environmental 
variables on turnaround given specific TMG-strategy 
interactions. These hypotheses posited that firms whose 
TMGs specializations fit with the firm's turnaround strategy 
would be better able to take advantage of environmental 
munificence or better mitigate problems created by 
environmental dynamism and complexity. Thus, Hypotheses 4a 
through 4c stated that environmental munificence would be 
more positively related to performance for firms whose TMG- 
strategy profiles matched those posited in Hypotheses 2a 
through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other profiles. 
Hypothesis 4b, which stated that environmental munificence 
would be more positively related to performance for firms 
implementing a domain offense strategy whose TMGs had an 
administrative specialization than for firms whose TMGs had 
other specializations, received mixed support. Hypotheses 
4a and 4c were not supported.
Hypotheses 5a-5c stated that environmental dynamism 
would be less negatively related to performance for firms
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whose TMG-strategy profiles matched those posited in 
Hypotheses 2a through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other 
profiles. Hypothesis 5c, which stated that environmental 
dynamism would be less negatively related to performance for 
firms implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMGs had 
an environmental specialization than for firms whose TMGs 
had other specializations, received mixed support.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported.
Hypotheses 6a through 6c stated that environmental 
complexity would be less negatively related to performance 
for firms whose TMG profiles matched those posited in 
Hypotheses 2a through 2c than for firms whose TMGs had other 
profiles. Hypothesis 6a stated that environmental 
complexity would be less negatively related to performance 
for firms implementing a retrenchment strategy whose TMGs 
had a core specialization than for firms whose TMGs had 
other specializations. Contrary to expectations, the 
opposite relation was found. Hypotheses 6b and 6c were not 
supported.
Results from these integrative hypotheses, though 
limited, suggest the importance of studying turnaround in 
terms of comprehensive alignment among strategy, TMG 
characteristics, and environment. Investigating each of 
these three components individually provided only limited 
insight into turnaround. Examining performance as a 
function of the alignment among its strategy, and top
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management characteristics, and environment, however, 
offered some additional insights into turnaround.
Discussion of significant findings
Several implications can be drawn from these results. 
These implications will be discussed in terms of strategy, 
TMG characteristics, environment, and the integration of all 
three factors.
For research on turnaround strategies, the dissertation 
provides two important results. First, preliminary analysis 
showed that three of the strategies on the continuum existed 
in the sample. Although based on cluster analysis, which 
can find patterns in random data (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990), 
these results provide some support for framing turnaround 
strategies in terms of the continuum proposed in this 
dissertation. In addition, the continuum is based on 
previous studies of decline (Miles, 1982; Zammuto & Cameron, 
1988), and it is collectively exhaustive (i.e., all 
turnaround strategies can be placed on the continuum; cf. 
Chrisman, Hofer, & Boulton, 1988). Thus, the continuum may 
prove useful for subsequent turnaround studies by 
standardizing labels given to strategies and by providing 
specific instead of consolidated strategies that firms can 
implement to turn around. It should also be noted that one 
strategy on the continuum, domain consolidation, did not 
emerge as a discrete strategy. Possible reasons for this 
will be discussed below.
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Second, the lack of support for Hypothesis 1 also has 
important implications for turnaround research. The finding 
that none of the turnaround strategies consistently 
outperformed all other strategies indicates four possible 
situations— each firm's turnaround process may be too 
idiosyncratic to generalize, equifinality may be operating, 
other factors along with strategy may need to be considered, 
or methodological issues may need to be addressed. The 
first three possibilities will be discussed next. 
Methodological issues will be discussed in the Limitations 
section.
First, the lack of significant results may indicate 
that turnaround processes may be idiosyncratic for each 
firm. For example, examining the turnaround at Chrysler, 
one of the most heralded success stories in U.S. corporate 
history, shows some unique events. One critical event that 
helped Chrysler turn around was receiving U.S. government 
loan guarantees. Thus, part of Chrysler's turnaround 
involved employing a political strategy instead of the 
competitive strategies examined in this dissertation (Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978). Although each firm's turnaround 
undoubtedly has unique components, certain aspects may 
generalize. For example, Chrysler's turnaround success also 
resulted in part from its domain offense strategy which 
included introducing new products such as the K-car and 
minivan (Iacocca, 1983).
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These results may also indicate that some turnaround 
strategies may be equally effective in helping firms recover 
(i.e., equifinality may be operative, Thomas & Venkatraman, 
1988). Previous strategy research has found that more than 
one strategy may lead to high performance in a particular 
situation (Hambrick, 1983? Snow & Hrebeniak, 1980). This 
research has also shown, however, that strategies may vary 
in effectiveness across situations. In terms of turnaround 
research, the possibility that equifinality may be operative 
indicates that turnaround studies may need to specify the 
context within which a particular turnaround strategy will 
be effective. For example, Pearce and Robbins (1993) found 
that firms implementing a retrenchment strategy outperformed 
those not implementing a retrenchment strategy within the 
context of a declining industry. Results from this 
dissertation indicate, however, that this strategy is not 
the most effective strategy across all contexts.
Third, these results may indicate that turnaround 
research needs to include variables along with a firm's 
strategy. Reviewing previous studies in Table 1, however, 
shows that many studies have focused primarily on the 
relation between a firm's turnaround strategy and its 
subsequent performance. Results from this dissertation 
suggest that this focus may be too narrow given that several 
other factors besides strategy affect a firm's alignment 
(Summer et al., 1990). Thus, no one "best" strategy exists
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for firms in all turnaround situations, and other factors 
may need to be considered.
Another factor that could be considered is the role of 
a firm's TMG in turnaround. By focusing on each TMG's 
functional, company, and industry background (White et al., 
1994), the present study moved beyond simply looking at the 
frequently researched incumbent versus new management 
distinction to examine the skills that managers need to 
implement particular turnaround strategies. Thus, the 
dissertation investigated performance implications of TMG- 
strategy interaction for the first time in the context of 
turnaround strategies.
Results show that firms implementing a domain offense 
strategy whose TMGs have either an environmental or 
administrative specialization outperform those firms whose 
TMGs have a core specialization. This result is consistent 
with previous research that shows TMGs having an internal 
focus do not implement external-oriented strategies well 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984). Results also show that firms 
implementing a domain creation strategy whose TMGs have an 
administrative specialization outperform firms whose TMGs 
have other specializations. This result, however, is 
counter to Hypothesis 2c, which posited that an 
environmental specialization would fit best with domain 
creation strategy.
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Another important finding is that a core specialization 
never outperformed other specializations. This 
specialization had lower performance when matched with 
domain offense strategy (Hypothesis 2b) and in dealing with 
environmental complexity (Hypothesis 6a). These results 
offer some support for earlier research that recommended 
replacing incumbent managers to overcome organizational 
inertia. These results, however, only point to the benefit 
of replacing managers when their experience is limited to 
one company or to production within one industry.
Analysis of the stock hypotheses (Hypotheses 2d and 2e) 
also provided interesting results. First, contrary to 
expectations, increased TMG stock ownership led to decreased 
performance in terms of slack. Three possible explanations 
may account for these contrary findings. First, these 
results may reflect increased risk taking propensity by 
incumbent or new management in a turnaround situation 
because of a firm's poor performance. Prospect theory 
argues that when faced with poor performance, a TMG may 
engage in risk-seeking behaviors in hopes of reversing a 
firm's fortunes (Bowman, 1980? Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Because TMG members that owned 
stock in a declining firm faced financial risk from 
declining stock value along with human capital risk from job 
loss if a firm failed (cf. Zajac & Westphal, 1994), they may 
have engaged in risk-seeking behaviors in an attempt to
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turnaround. Taking on additional debt and lowering 
liquidity increased the risk of firm, but these actions also 
provided additional capital for investing in actions that 
may have led to turnaround.
Second, these results may reflect increasing risk 
taking propensity of new managers. Average management 
turnover was 49.27 percent (sd = 34.20) in firms with stock 
information available. Thus, on average, half of the TMG in 
each firm consisted of new managers. If these new managers 
had higher risk-taking propensities than incumbent managers, 
this could also account for increased debt usage and lower 
liquidity. This view of new managers as risk takers is 
consistent with the psychological profile of turnaround 
managers noted in the practitioner literature (e.g.,
Bibeault, 1982; Gerstein & Reisman, 1983).
Third, in terms of potential slack, these results may 
reflect an attempt to increase stockholder wealth by 
increasing a firm's leverage. Because interest on debt is 
tax-deductible, TMGs may be able to pass a portion of a 
firm's cost of capital from stockholders to the government 
(Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994). Consequently, within limits, 
TMGs can create value for stockholders (including 
themselves) by taking on additional debt (Kaplan, 1989).
In terms of examining the effect of a firm's 
environment on its turnaround effort, the present study 
moved beyond narrow views of the environment such as
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industry growth rates to examine a broader view of 
environmental munificence. Additionally, the role of 
environmental dynamism and complexity were also examined. 
Results show that a firm's environment has only a limited 
relation with its turnaround. Dynamism and complexity were 
significantly related only to profitability.
Support for this hypothesis would have indicated that 
environmental determinism plays a major role in 
organizational turnaround (cf. Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984; 
Scherer, 1980). As with Hypothesis 1, however, the lack of 
significance for these variables should not be surprising. 
Although the environment is an important component affecting 
a firm's alignment, examining only a firm's environmental 
characteristics may present too narrow of an explanation. 
Evidence that firms can sustain performance even in 
industries experiencing decreasing demand (Harrigan, 1980; 
Zammuto & Cameron, 1984) and that firms can fail even in 
industries experiencing increasing demand (D'Aveni, 1989) 
provides additional support for moving beyond a narrow focus 
on environmental characteristics. Furthermore, previous 
research has also shown that environmental characteristics 
have a limited impact on firm performance relative to firm- 
specific factors such as strategy (Rumelt, 1991). Thus, 
other factors along with environmental factors need to be 
considered when examining how firms regain alignment and 
turnaround.
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These results should not be interpreted as indicating 
that environmental characteristics do not affect a firm’s 
turnaround. The effect of the environment, however, may 
depend on each firm's situation. For example, additional 
analysis showed that munificence is significantly related to 
profitability (p<.05) for firms implementing a retrenchment 
strategy and to profitability relative to the risk free rate 
(pc.Ol) for firms implementing a domain creation strategy. 
These results indicate that environmental characteristics 
can affect turnaround. Focusing only on environmental 
variables as a factor in a firm's turnaround, however, is 
too narrow a view and other factors need to be considered.
The integrative hypotheses (Hypotheses 4 through 6) 
begin to provide insight into the complexity of the 
turnaround process. Turnaround strategy (Hypothesis 1) was 
not significant and environmental characteristics 
(Hypothesis 3) were limited in explaining performance. When 
the combined effects of turnaround strategy, TMG 
characteristics, and environment characteristics were 
examined, however, some differences in performance occurred. 
Although these results are limited, they provide some 
evidence of performance benefits gained from achieving fit 
between a firm's strategy, TMG characteristics, and 
environment.
Overall, these results indicate that focusing on 
important components of a firm's alignment may provide
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insights into the turnaround process. Moreover, because the 
dissertation employs a cross-industry sample, these results 
should be generalizable. This generalizability, however, 
does trade off specific recommendations for a given 
industry. This and other limitations will be discussed 
next.
Limitations of results 
As with all studies, this dissertation has limitations 
that should be noted. These include limited statistical 
power, survival bias, limited focus on process variables, 
and sample characteristics. These limitations will be 
discussed next. Theoretical and measurement issues will 
also be highlighted.
Statistical power
Even drawing from a large database such as COMPUSTAT, 
sample size may serve as an explanation for lack of 
significance for some of the hypotheses. This lack of power 
became especially problematic for Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 
where the maximum power attained was only .32 (Cohen, 1977) 
because of the small sample sizes created by dividing firms 
by strategy and then again by TMG specialization. Thus, 
results should be viewed as conservative tests of these 
hypotheses.
One way to overcome this limitation may be to relax the 
stringent performance definition employed in this 
dissertation. For the current study, firms had to have
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profitability below the risk-free rate and decreasing slack 
for three years. Thus, firms that were selected were in 
dire straits. Other recent research (e.g., Robbins &
Pearce, 1992) has examined decline employing a two-year time 
horizon. Given the severity of the present decline 
definition, relaxing this definition slightly may be 
warranted. Less stringent criteria would still indicate 
that a firm was in decline, but these criteria would also
allow for a larger sample to be selected to investigate
these hypotheses.
Survival bias
Another limitation of the reported investigation is 
that all the firms in the focal sample were still
operational at the end of the focal timeframe. What is not
apparent from these results is how many firms implemented a 
strategy or attained a strategy-TMG match and still failed 
(i.e., declared bankruptcy). Thus, including these failed 
firms may impact the results found in this dissertation (cf. 
Barker & Mone, 1994). Additional research is needed to 
examine the extent of this survival bias especially in 
turnaround literature where firm survival is such a focal 
issue.
Process variables
A third limitation to the present study is that it 
examines each firm's realized strategy (Mintzberg, 1978).
The process of how a turnaround strategy is decided upon,
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the political process involved within a firm facing decline, 
and issues related to implementing the strategy throughout 
the firm were not examined. For example, TMG backgrounds 
may predispose them to selecting a particular turnaround 
strategy (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Process issues in a 
turnaround are undoubtedly critical in the turnaround 
process (Barker & Mone, 1994) but were beyond the scope of 
the present dissertation.
Sample characteristics
Although this cross-industry sample may be 
generalizable, it also has some limitations. First, results 
from this dissertation are general. Specific decline 
situations in different industries may require that 
additional variables be considered. Suggestions for some of 
these variables are discussed below. Second, only U.S. 
public firms are included in this sample. Private firms may 
have different turnaround issues because owners may have 
different goals and different required rates of return than 
stockholders in public firms (Porter, 1980). Additional 
research is also necessary to see if these results 
generalize to non-U.S. firms because of different industry 
structures and stakeholder relations (Porter, 1990). 
Measurement issues
Some possible limitations related to measuring 
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental variables 
should also be noted. In terms of strategy, the lack of a
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domain consolidation strategy needs to be addressed. In 
this study, domain consolidation was grouped together with 
an efficiency strategy. Although both strategies involve 
cutting back on assets and expenses, domain consolidation 
represents a much more drastic strategy. The fact that this 
strategy did not emerge as a distinct strategy in the 
present sample is surprising given the recent increased 
frequency of corporate domain consolidation (Cameron, 
Freeman, & Mishra, 1993; DeWitt, 1993). Two possible 
reasons may explain this result. First, firms may only take 
drastic action such as selling entire divisions when faced 
with severe decline situations (Bibeault, 1982). 
Consequently, several firms implementing this strategy may 
have been eliminated from the sample because they eventually 
went bankrupt. This possibility again highlights potential 
survival bias within the sample. Second, the measures 
employed for domain initiative and domain reduction may need 
further refinement. Although these measures have been 
employed in previous research (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) and 
have been found to be valid measures for assessing changes 
in a firm's domain (Montgomery, 1982) , they may be too 
coarse to differentiate between retrenchment and domain 
consolidation. A possible alternative may be to employ an 
entropy measure of diversification (Palepu, 1985) that 
weights the relative size of a firm's business segments 
based on sales. Employing this finer-grained measure would
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also allow investigation into whether firms sell major 
divisions in turnaround attempts or trim peripheral 
divisions in their attempts to regain alignment and turn around.
Measurement issues related to TMG characteristics also 
need to be addressed. The limited findings suggest that 
four issues may be important. First, different TMG 
characteristics may have only a limited impact on a TMG's 
ability to implement a turnaround strategy. Some 
researchers have suggested that TMGs may not be as 
influenced by functional "blinders" as academics have 
proposed (Walsh, 1988) or that decision making changes so 
much at the top level that TMGs must move beyond their 
functional biases and rely on a wider range of information 
sources (Waller, Huber, & Glick, 1995). Thus, although TMG 
characteristics have been shown to impact the strategy- 
performance relation for some strategies (e.g., 
diversification strategy, Michel & Hambrick, 1993), this 
impact may be limited in the context of turnaround 
strategies.
Second, the TMG specialization typology employed in 
this dissertation may need to be reconsidered. This 
typology has several advantages over previous 
classifications including it is theoretically based and 
empirically derived, it integrates functional specialization 
and executive employment within a firm into a single 
measure, and it overcomes problems in previous research
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resulting from using different operationalizations of TMG 
characteristics. The typology, however, was developed at 
the individual level of analysis and may not be as 
applicable at the group level (i.e., TMGs). Specifically, 
because each TMG was not a "pure" type (i.e., each team 
consisted of managers with core, administrative, and 
environmental backgrounds), error may have been introduced. 
Although hypotheses were developed recognizing that TMGs 
would have a "dominant background" instead of a "pure 
background", the fact that some TMGs were classified as 
having a particular specialization when the TMG had less 
than half of its members from that specialization may have 
influenced the results.
Third, the method employed in this dissertation to 
designate each firm's TMG may not have accounted for all a 
firm's TMG members. TMGs have been measured in several ways 
including inside board members (Bantel & Finkelstein, 1994), 
top two management levels (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), mangers 
above the level of vice president (Michel & Hambrick, 1992), 
or managers designated by the CEO (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). 
Although asking CEOs exactly who was a member of the TMG may 
have been a preferable method, limited access to top 
managers and possible problems from recalling TMG members up 
to 20 years ago precluded employing this approach.
Fourth, the relation between TMG characteristics and 
strategy may be conceptualized incorrectly. Following the
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majority of previous TMG-strategy interaction research 
(e.g., Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Michel & Hambrick, 1992), 
this dissertation hypothesized that firms whose TMGs have 
specializations that match particular turnaround strategies 
would outperform firms whose TMGs do not have this match. 
This hypothesis was tested by examining performance 
differences across TMG specializations for each strategy. 
Thus, the dissertation tested this relation employing a 
moderation perspective. Although moderation represents one 
way of examining performance effects of TMG-strategy fit, 
other perspectives exist (Hambrick, 1989). One alternative 
conceptualization may be that turnaround strategy and TMG 
characteristics are only two of several important variables 
in examining turnaround. Consequently, insights may be 
possible from examining turnaround from a configurational 
approach (Miller & Friesen, 1977; Mintzberg, 1990). Under 
this conceptualization of fit, firms could be classified 
employing a set of theoretical attributes to derive profiles 
of successful and unsuccessful turnaround strategies (cf. 
Hambrick, 1983). This conceptualization would allow 
expanding beyond the linear, bivariate relation between 
turnaround strategy and TMG specialization examined in this 
dissertation to include other potentially important 
variables such as a TMG's decision processes (Staw et al., 
1981) and a firm's external relations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). This conceptualization would also facilitate
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assessing the possibility that more than one turnaround 
configuration can be successful within a particular 
environment (i.e., equifinality could be investigated; Doty, 
Glick, & Huber, 1993; Venkatraman, 1989).
Methodological issues related to the stock hypotheses 
also need to be addressed. Previous research based on 
agency theory hypothesized a positive relation between TMG 
stock ownership and a firm's performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Thus, this relation was also hypothesized to apply in 
turnaround situations (Hypothesis 2d). Recent empirical 
evidence has shown, however, that the relation between TMG 
stock ownership and a firm's performance may not be linear. 
Specifically, as a TMG increases its stock ownership, a 
larger percentage of the TMG's income is tied to a firm's 
performance. Consequently, a TMG may become risk averse and 
make decisions that run counter to stockholder wealth 
maximization beyond some ownership point because a greater 
part of the TMG's income is at risk (Wright, Ferris, Sarin,
& Awasthi, 1996). Thus, the linear relation hypothesized in 
this dissertation may not hold over the entire range of TMG 
stock ownership.
Additionally, agency theory contends that TMGs have an 
incentive to implement a domain creation strategy to 
diversify their employment risk, even if this strategy does 
not create additional value for stockholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). When TMGs own stock in the company, their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
interests become more aligned with stockholders and, 
therefore, it is expected that they would only implement a 
domain creation strategy if this strategy was expected to 
create value. Thus, the relation between TMG stock 
ownership and turnaround should be higher when firms 
implement a domain creation strategy then under other 
strategies (Hypothesis 2e). Theoretical and methodological 
issues may account for a lack of significant findings for 
this hypothesis. First, in terms of theoretical issues, the 
findings may result from applying agency theory arguments to 
a situation where such arguments may not hold.
Specifically, according to agency theory, a TMG may 
diversify a firm to reduce a firm's risk and, by extension, 
the TMG's employment risk. This reduction in a firm's risk, 
however, results from stabilizing (i.e., reducing the 
variability of) the firm's income stream. Although 
stabilizing a firm's income stream can reduce the threat of 
bankruptcy (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994), stabilizing this 
income stream at a low level of performance could actually 
increase a TMG's employment risk because TMGs may be fired 
for a firm's chronic poor performance. Thus, the unique 
situation faced by TMGs in turnaround situations may limit 
agency theory arguments.
Additionally, the findings may result from three 
methodological issues. In this sample, only 18 firms 
implementing a domain creation strategy had stock data
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
available. Thus, a larger sample may have yielded stronger 
results. A second methodological issue occurs because the 
stock data were collected over the entire decline and 
turnaround process. Some firms, however, experienced 
dramatic changes in the amount of stock ownership (e.g., the 
departure of a founder). Thus, a shorter timeframe may be 
required to investigate the effect of stock ownership.
Third, from a measurement perspective, these results could 
have also occurred because a TMG's stock options were not 
included. Because of the theoretical difficulties in 
valuing these options presented above, the hypotheses were 
tested without including options. Options, however, may 
substantially alter a TMG's stock holdings and, thus, TMG 
members' motives. For example, during Chrysler's 
performance nadir in 1981, the company's CEO, Lee Iacocca, 
only owned 1000 shares of Chrysler stock. He held options, 
however, that gave him the right to acquire up to an 
additional 320,000 shares (Chrvsler's 10-K. 1981). 
Consequently, additional research may be warranted to 
determine if stock options impact the results found in this 
study.
Measurement issues may also have impacted the 
environmental hypotheses. Three possible explanations exist 
for the limited significant results for these hypotheses. 
First, the variables employed may have inadequately measured 
environmental characteristics. For example, Dess and Beard
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(1984) define dynamism as change that is difficult to 
predict and that heightens uncertainty for TMGs. The 
measure of dynamism employed in this dissertation does gauge 
variability of sales and employment, but these measures may 
not tap into the "unpredictability" of this variability. 
Although this measurement issue may provide a partial 
explanation for the limited results, previous research 
(e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988; Palmer, 1994) supports the use of 
these variables to measure environmental characteristics. 
Second, these results may have occurred because of the 
timeframe employed by the study. Two environmental 
variables, munificence and dynamism, were measured as 
changes in these characteristics over a firm's entire 
decline. Previous research has shown, however, that an 
environment's impact on a firm in financial trouble may be 
sudden and dramatic. For example, Hambrick and D'Aveni 
(1988) found that firms experiencing a downward performance 
spiral often failed following a sudden environmental shift. 
Environmental variables, therefore, may have to be measured 
employing a shorter timeframe. Third, the results may have 
occurred because of the characteristics of the particular 
sample employed. The mean sales growth rate for industries 
was 8.91 (sd = 5.16), which indicates that most firms were 
operating in mature industries (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). 
These industries are characterized by slow growth and 
established market shares (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).
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Consequently, most firms in the sample operated in fairly 
predictable environments. The relation between 
environmental variables and turnaround may be stronger in 
emergent or growth industries (cf. Eisenhardt &
Schoonhooven, 1991).
Future research 
The results and limitations of this dissertation also 
indicate possible future research opportunities. These 
possibilities will be discussed in terms of turnaround 
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environmental variables.
In examining turnaround strategies, future research 
could adopt a resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) and examine the implications that 
resources have on the relation between turnaround strategy 
and performance. This dissertation examined TMG 
backgrounds, which can serve as resources for firms 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Other variables that future 
research could examine include a firm's brand name and 
organizational culture (Barney, 1991).
In terms of examining TMG issues, future research could 
also examine the role of other key stakeholders and their 
influence on a TMG's actions. First, institutions with 
large stock holdings (e.g., pension funds) in a declining 
company may exert important influence on TMG's actions 
(Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). Second, from a resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), other
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stakeholders may play an important role in turnaround. For 
example, the role of a firm's board of directors may be an 
important variable because outside directors may be able to 
provide access to capital (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; 
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).
Future research could also investigate other aspects of 
TMG-strategy interaction. This dissertation is the first to 
investigate the effects of TMG-strategy interaction on 
turnaround, and future studies could build on findings in 
this study. For example, hypotheses in this dissertation 
examining domain creation looked only at this strategy in 
general as expanding beyond a firm's current industry scope. 
Another factor to consider would be whether this domain 
creation results in related or unrelated diversification 
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). The TMG specializations 
may have different interaction effects for these different 
types of domain creation. For example, for related 
diversification, an administrative specialization may fit 
better with the strategy whereas for unrelated 
diversification, an environmental specialization might 
provide a better match (cf. Michel & Hambrick, 1992).
Future research could also examine additional 
environmental characteristics that impact turnaround. This 
dissertation investigated environmental variables 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity to examine industry 
variables, but other industry variables may also warrant
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future research. One such variable is the amount of 
managerial discretion present in an industry (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). Managerial discretion represents the 
degree of latitude managers have in making organizational 
decisions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). For example, a 
utility company's TMG has to contend with regulatory 
constraints that allow fewer strategic choices than the TMG 
of a computer company (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1992). In a 
turnaround context, this ability to make strategic decisions 
may also be critical. For example, although domain 
consolidation represents a possible turnaround strategy, 
some firms may face barriers to exiting an industry such as 
severance contracts, nonmarketable assets, emotional 
attachment, or relationship with other business units within 
the firm (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Porter, 1980). Leaving an 
industry or major segment, therefore, may be prohibitively 
expensive for firms facing these barriers even if the firm's 
performance within a particular industry has declined 
substantially. Consequently, the performance implications 
of turnaround strategies such as domain consolidation may 
vary with different levels of managerial discretion.
Summary
This dissertation has examined issues related to 
organizational turnaround. It has examined the role of 
strategy, TMG characteristics, and environment and found
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that employing an integrative view provided insight into the 
turnaround process. In addition, the dissertation developed 
a continuum of turnaround strategies and highlighted 
important performance measurement issues that should be 
considered in future research. Finally, it discussed some 
limitations and presented ideas for future research.
In conclusion, this dissertation begins to provide 
insights into important aspects of the turnaround process 
and provides the basis for future research. It shows that 
there are no simple answers in turnaround (e.g., implement 
one best strategy or simply replace all the managers), and 
it offers a broader conceptualization of the turnaround 
process.
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NOTES
Top management groups have been defined differently 
across studies. In general, the term top-management group 
refers to the upper tier of management that is responsible 
for formulating and implementing strategic direction. A 
firm's chief executive officer (or president), chief 
operating officer, and vice presidents in charge of major 
corporate divisions are generally included in the 
definition.
Zm Stanwick (1992) is the only study that empirically 
examines management characteristics in turnaround 
situations. In this study, he investigated the impact that 
the source (i.e., insider versus outsider) and functional 
background of a newly-hired CEO has on turnaround strategy 
selection and subsequent performance. The dissertation will 
build on these results by investigating how TMG 
characteristics interact with particular turnaround 
strategies and how this interaction affects turnaround 
performance.
3- Ramanujam's finding that 90.3 percent of manufacturing 
firms in the COMPUSTAT data base experienced three or more 
years of declining ROI from 1962-1979 raises further doubts 
about the adequacy of employing only profitability to 
measure decline and turnaround.
The Miles/Zammuto/Cameron classification scheme also 
includes "domain defense" and "domain substitution" 
strategies. Domain defense involves political strategies 
and building external support. Domain substitution involves 
moving into a totally new business in situations where a 
firm's current niche totally collapses. Both of these 
strategies fall outside the scope of this dissertation and, 
therefore, are reserved for future research.
5* Research on TMGs has also examined the role of other 
characteristics such as age or educational background.
Little evidence exists, however, in the decline and 
turnaround literature that would suggest that these 
characteristics affect implementation of a turnaround 
strategy.
6* White et al.'s (1994) framework for classifying TMGs 
according to career experiences offers three major benefits 
relative to previous operationalizations. First, their 
typology is theoretically based and empirically derived from 
a sample of 544 Fortune 1000 executives. Second, their 
typology integrates functional specialization and executive 
employment with a company (i.e., insider versus outsider) 
into a single measure. This measure allows researchers to
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make important distinctions such as differentiating among 
executives who have spent their entire career with one 
company from these who have spent their entire career within 
one industry, but with several companies from those who have 
career experiences in several industries. Third, the 
typology overcomes problems in previous research resulting 
from different operationalizations of TMG characteristics. 
For example, previous studies have defined TMG functional 
specializations using classification schemes ranging from 2 
possible functions (Thomas et al., 1991) to 12 possible 
functions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). These different 
operationalizations have made comparisons across studies 
difficult.
7* Bourgeois (1981) argues that slack can also represent 
inefficiency within an organization. He contends that the 
correlation between slack and effectiveness may be inverted 
U-shaped because too much slack may indicate severe 
inefficiency. Given the proposed study's focus low slack 
situations, however, problems associated with excess slack 
are unlikely to be a problem. Future research should also 
explore problems and remedies for firms that have too much 
slack which could build on the "success breeds failure" 
argument (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).
8- Other measures of slack have also been suggested. For 
example, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) and Singh (1986) used 
selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales as a 
measure of slack. This measure, however, may reflect 
inefficiency more than slack (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988).
9* Although examining expenses such as advertising 
separately would have been preferable, COMPUSTAT often 
aggregates these expenses under sales, general, and 
administrative (SGA) expenses. SGA includes marketing and 
advertising expenses, however, and, thus, provides a 
suitable measure for expenses.
10- The data were not standardized prior to cluster analysis 
for two reasons. First, standardization may reduce or 
eliminate meaningful differences among variables (Edelbrock, 
1979; Ketchen & Shook, in press). Second, because all 
variables were measured as a percentage change from a base 
year, the ranges did not markedly differ across variables 
(Hair et al., 1992).
11* The severity of firm's financial health can be 
determined employing Altman's (1988) .Z-score by comparing it 
to the following scale:
Z = 3.00 or above indicates that a firm will not go
bankrupt.
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Z = 1.81 or below indicates that a firm will go
bankrupt.
Z = between 1.81 and 3.00 falls into a "zone of
ignorance" for predicting whether the firm will go 
bankrupt.
12- The market share measure precluded considering focus 
strategies in the regression equation. Although this is a 
limitation, it may not be a major concern given that the 
sample is comprised of large, public firms and each firm's 
market share is measured in its primary industry. These 
large firms are unlikely to employ a focus strategy in their 
primary markets.
13- For example, employing the same source for TMG data as 
this dissertation, Barbosa (1985) found 82 percent of a 
random sample of corporate officers identified their own 
dominant functional background as the same as he had 
identified from Dun and Bradstreet's Reference Book of 
Corporate Management.
14’ Note that an analysis employing a Harris-Kaiser 
orthogonal rotation, which accounts for correlations among 
factors, yielded similar results.
15- Note that analyses including the outliers obtained 
similar results.
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